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INTRODUCTION
This is an era characterized by changing relationships, rapid and large-scale
transnational interactions, and the globalization of previously local activities and
concerns. It poses great, and often urgent, challenges to policy-makers, activists, and
analysts working to promote world stability. Many of the foundations that support
such work have concluded that, in the midst of uncertainty, cooperation and social
innovation at all levels of human activity are necessary if individuals and societies are
to manage and adapt to change. Foundations recognize that they can and must play a
role in making this possible.
This paper argues for an integrated grant-making strategy for world security,
stewardship, and the peaceful management of change. Its method would be:
• to enhance the accountability, transparency, and efficacy of state and civil
society institutions; and
• to embed them in collaborative arrangements, or regimes, designed to
cooperatively address the challenges ahead.
These regimes would rely on a combination of state and non-state actors, with the
mantle of leadership shifting from one to the other according to the task at hand.
In making this case, the paper focuses, therefore, on five increasingly global actors:
the individual, the nation-state, civil society organizations (CSOs), private sector
corporations, and multilateral institutions. Part I considers the trends that continually
redefine relations among these decision-makers, the dangers to which they contribute
or fall victim, and opportunities for innovative partnerships among them.
For much of the twentieth century, foundations played a vital role in strengthening
international actors by supporting academic and policy-relevant research, practical
experimentation, and public education. Grant-makers actively worked to improve
governance at all levels. Most recently, they have attempted to help state and non-
state actors understand and manage fast-paced change and have begun to adjust their
funding programs accordingly. The paper’s second part, therefore, reports on the
ways that foundations have restructured their programs and reoriented their funding
strategies so as to help new decision-makers come to grips with the transformation
under way.
The paper’s third part puts forward a four-part agenda for future grant-making aimed
at helping to provide the building blocks of a dynamic but stable new order that is
both sustainable and secure. It argues that foundations can and should continue to be
bold. In a time of swift public judgments and unforgiving market response,
foundations may be alone in their willingness to take risks, withstand criticism, and
make long-term investments in the public interest. It is therefore important that they
remain at the cutting edge of social innovation, recognizing that the most significant
results of their contributions may not be those that are immediately apparent.
 The author wishes to express her
gratitude to the trustees of the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund and to the
Fund’s president Colin G. Campbell for
their inspiration, leadership, and
unfailing support throughout the life of
the Project on World Security; and to
members of the Project’s Core Advisory
Group, including Colin G. Campbell,
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., John D. Steinbruner,
General John Galvin, Emma Rothschild,
John P. Holdren, Jessica T. Mathews,
William Luers, Jean-Francois Rischard,
Kennette Benedict, Rev. J. Bryan Hehir,
and Russell A. Phillips, whose vision,
advocacy, and hard work helped to shape
the Project’s mission and its products;
and to Renée de Nevers, whose brilliant
editing and sound advice greatly
enhanced the quality of the Project’s
work. Also essential to the Project’s
success was the energy, good humor, and
helpful research provided by Gwyneth J.
Borden. Amir Pasic was kind enough to
provide his comments, criticisms, and
supporting arguments throughout, as
were the Rockefeller Brothers Fund
program staff and the many outstanding
scholars, foundation officers, and
nongovernmental organization (NGO)
leaders to whom the Project turned for
ideas and guidance. While influenced
and informed by the vibrant community
of specialists in the fields of international
relations, security, and science, the views
expressed in this document are solely
those of the author.
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PART I:  AN ERA OF CHANGE
The context that gives rise to an integrated approach to grant-making in support of
world stability is one of rapid and sometimes wrenching change. The Cold War’s end
uncovered a kaleidoscope of interacting trends that are altering relations within and
among states and across sectors and disciplines. If well managed, these trends can
combine to invigorate states and empower individuals, enhancing security,
stewardship, and quality of life. If unmanaged or mismanaged, these same forces can
undermine the capacity of states to govern and of nature to provide.
A. GLOBAL TRENDS
At least three transnational trends, or drivers of change, define a new era, often
referred to as the Knowledge Era or the Information Age:
• The first driver of change is the communications revolution’s worldwide
diffusion of information, capital, technology, and ideas. This “third industrial
revolution” has decentralized decision-making and authority and has enhanced
the role of networks of nongovernmental actors, both legitimate and criminal.
• The second, related trend is the ongoing restructuring of the globalized
economy, redistributing wealth and power. The global economy has lifted
millions of people from poverty. It has raised levels of opportunity. But it has
also raised levels of uncertainty, producing stunning reversals of fortune, as the
contagion of financial crises demonstrates. While many benefit from economic
globalization, others have been left behind, and potentially destabilizing
inequities remain. In the structural shift in labor markets from manufacturing
to knowledge-based jobs, the income advantage of those with access to
education is rapidly growing, threatening new divisions along educational lines.
• The third trend relates to demographic shifts, including aging societies in the
developed world and population surges at the low end of the economic and
educational ladder in the developing world. These surges will add almost one
billion people per decade to the global population and will require a doubling
of food and a tripling of energy production in the next 50 years, stressing an
already strained natural environment. A young, mobile population will move to
cities at a rate of one million per week, requiring water, electricity, sewage,
transportation, and sources of employment. No society is fully prepared.
While the full consequences of the interactions among these trends are not known, it
is clear that all societies are experiencing transitions, and none can manage these
processes on its own. Whether individuals and societies succeed or fail in the face of
global trends depends in large measure on the degree to which they are integrated
into a larger political, economic, and security order.
B. GLOBAL DANGERS
Security specialists argue that the stakes of such integration are high. For example,
spurred and enabled by smart policies and the revolution in information,
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communications, and transportation technologies, successful states on every
continent have joined the world economy. They have benefited from global trade and
investment flows, enabling them to provide for their citizens who, in turn, can join
world society. The stake these individuals, societies, and state governments have in
the international order is apparent. Indeed, some scholars argue that wars among
these states are increasingly improbable as the potential costs rise and perceived
benefits decline. Other states have become economic outcasts—some by their leaders’
choice but most by their inability to provide effective governance, navigate societal
stresses, and compete on a global scale. As a result, their citizens have been starved of
the capital, technology, and training needed to succeed in the Knowledge Era.
Majorities have no stake in the existing order, and violence within these states,
ranging from spontaneous rioting to organized civil conflict, is increasingly likely.
Furthermore, the global economy is a fierce task master. With the speed of millions
of independent electronic transfers, it can take away all that it gives. States that have
opened their economies find that global markets have rules, and the punishment for
failing to abide by them can be sudden, harsh, and globally consequential. Societies in
transition, in which expectations have been raised and subsequently dashed, can be
the most vulnerable to political instability, environmental destruction, and violent
conflict.
While information-driven integration can strengthen individuals, states, and societies,
it also has costs. Old dangers are transformed, and new ones emerge. Both diminish
the significance of political boundaries and require a collaborative response. The
traditional security concerns about Great Power conflict, the emergence of regional
hegemons, and the nuclear danger remain salient. There is a need to assess the degree
to which transnational trends exacerbate or ameliorate these and other pressing
dangers. Among those dangers are:
• Weapons Proliferation and Arms Transfers: Advanced weapons materials,
technology, and expertise have become more widely available, as all freely cross
borders, export controls are relaxed, and states relinquish their monopoly over the
development and production of key weapons components. The breakdown of
controls over former Soviet forces and the spread of nuclear capability to South Asia
have given cooperative nonproliferation efforts new urgency. Regional arms races
offer insights into the demand side of the proliferation problem. And they underscore
the importance of both establishing universal norms and of crafting region-wide
solutions that prevent the emergence of hegemonic neighbors. The proliferation
problem encompasses the full range of military technology, from weapons of mass
destruction and weapons of precision guidance, to more humble technologies, such as
anti-personnel land mines, rifles, and explosives.
• Hyper-Nationalism: Social, cultural, environmental, and economic dislocations that
accompany globalization and modernization can give rise to destructive strains of
nationalism and tribalism. When tapped by political opportunists and combined with
the growing norm of self-determination, these impulses can fuel communal conflict,
leading to widespread violence, state collapse, and even interstate war.
• Terrorism: Weakened states offer training grounds and safe havens for terrorist
groups whose reach has been extended by the spread of technologies. Moreover,
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advances in information technologies have given the United States and its allies
overwhelming advantage on the battlefield, which may drive potential enemies to
eschew traditional forms of warfare in favor of terrorism. Increasingly porous borders,
a growing reliance on a vulnerable electronic infrastructure, and the worldwide
availability of advanced weapons provide powerful incentives for governments and
industries to cooperate in protecting against terrorist attacks, while at the same time
preserving civil liberties of citizens and non-citizens alike.
• Transnational Crime: As economic transactions become increasingly transnational,
so too does organized crime. Citizens rely on their governments, both local and
national, for the provision of public order. But in the face of powerful multinational
criminal cartels, no community can fully protect its own. There are no well-
developed mechanisms for addressing transnational crime. There are only extradition
treaties and Interpol, a wire service that enables national law enforcement agencies to
communicate with their counterparts in other states. Cross-border cooperation is
needed not only to prevent crimes and apprehend their perpetrators but also to
address the societal problems that engender criminal activity.
• Social and Economic Inequity: While markets may provide for the “rational”
distribution of wealth, they do not assure equity. Economic disparities can reinforce
social divides, which can undermine societal cohesion and success. States will need to
assure their citizens that, while the costs and benefits of economic globalization are
not equitably distributed, there are mechanisms in place for ensuring greater equity.
But fears of international market response constrain the impulse to make local public
investments or redistribute wealth. Basic rules of equity that transcend borders,
economies, and cultures may be required to form the basis for sound social policy.
• Infectious Diseases: The volume, scale, and speed of global trade and travel have
raised the risk that emerging infectious diseases and new, drug-resistant strains of old
ones will spread. It is possible to reach any national capital from virtually every corner
of the earth within  hours. Yet the incubation period for many of the most deadly
diseases is one of several days. Identifying, treating, and perhaps eradicating the
disease at its source is the only reliable means of protection and is a global obligation.
Multinational, multilayered, and multisectoral networks are needed to provide early
warning of outbreaks and to provide the basis for organizing coordinated action.
• Resources Mal-Distribution or Scarcity: The livelihood of nearly one-third of the
earth’s population depends on direct access to natural resources that can be grown,
gathered, or caught. As populations and commerce grow, so too will the demands
placed on a fixed or declining resource base. The poorest societies will be most hard-
hit by scarcity of land, water, and forest products or by mal-distribution due to lack
of proper infrastructure and efficient local governance. Similarly, the convergence of
poor policy, inadequate infrastructure, and bad weather conditions can threaten the
security of basic food sources. The resulting misery can produce effects throughout
the region and beyond: hunger, famine, disease, societal breakdown, violent conflict,
mass migrations, and environmental damage.
• Environmental Degradation: Population pressures in the developing world may
combine with unsustainable levels of consumption in the developed world to bring
about the gradual altering of the earth’s physiology. Scientists warn that human
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behavior—particularly the burning of fossil fuels—has had a discernable impact on
global climate. The possibility that warming and weather extremes will result raises
concerns about physical damage and loss of life on a large scale. Similarly, ozone
depletion and biodiversity loss produce irreversible effects, the full consequences of
which are yet to be known. Without cooperative efforts to innovate and regulate, the
earth’s capacity to support life as we know it may be undermined.
C. GLOBAL ACTORS
At the same time that these dangers have emerged, so has a plethora of new players,
able to advance or undermine security, sustainability, and quality of life. They
include large, populous, and resourceful states that have been newly strengthened by
the global economy, as well as non-state actors that have grown in number, power,
and political significance. Their fates are intertwined.
• The Individual. The individual citizen’s reach has been extended by information
and transportation technologies. Many of the dangers faced and the solutions offered
are the result of the aggregate effect of citizens’ separate choices. The challenge of
promoting personal responsibility, therefore, can be a global interest.
• The Nation-State. The nation-state remains a central actor in managing economic,
environmental, and social policy; in protecting basic group and individual rights; in
meeting security needs; and in providing for the public good. The challenge is to
build, refine, and continually adapt the institutions and processes of national
governance to keep up with the pace of change.
• Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). CSOs, or nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), have grown increasingly influential at the local, national, and transnational
levels. Their growing impact raises the challenge of ensuring that they adhere to the
same standards of accountability, transparency, and efficacy that are applied to
governmental actors.
• Private Sector Corporations. Multinational corporations and other private sector
actors have joined governments in regulating the terms of international trade.
Increasingly, corporations and industry groups cooperate on issues like environmental
or labor standards to which their subsidiaries will be held. Furthermore, they are key
to implementing and monitoring certain weapons nonproliferation agreements.
• Multilateral Institutions, Transnational Organizations, and Global Regimes. These
institutions, understandings, and arrangements, charged with global governance,
jointly manage the transnational issues and dangers that could otherwise undermine
the success of all.
The challenge is to strengthen and inform each of these actors, while encouraging
their collaboration, as none can be successful on its own. The capacity of a state is a
function of the ingenuity of its citizenry. Individuals cannot thrive without a just and
reliable order that only a healthy, accountable state can provide. The more capable
the state, its civil society, and corporate sector, the better able it is to contribute to
efforts to address transnational dangers. The more embedded the state in global
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regimes, the more likely it will be able to meet its citizens’ needs and expectations and
fulfill its domestic governance responsibilities.
Transnational governance requires the establishment of relationships, understandings,
and shared expectations that are both self-regulating and self-sustaining. It demands a
commitment on the part of all actors to prevent or contain global wildfires and to
take greater responsibility for themselves, for one another, and for the future. It
demands innovative partnerships that cut across all levels of global activity, from
individuals to states to international institutions. These new arrangements and
understandings should take advantage of the growing competence of states and non-
state actors and their new-found experience in problem-solving and governance across
political, disciplinary, and sectoral lines. Because these trends and their effects are
transnational in nature, so too must be the efforts to manage them. Despite the
impressive array of norms, agreements, institutions and processes, for global
governance that have emerged over the past  years, the demand continues to
outstrip the supply.
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PART II:  FOUNDATION RESPONSES
TO A CHANGING WORLD
Foundations were involved in issues relating to security, sustainability, and quality of
life for much of the twentieth century. Their ongoing support for collaboration and
invention is critical to meeting the governance challenges ahead. After Communism’s
collapse, they were quick to consider whether something larger than the failure of the
Soviet state was underway. They inquired whether a process of fundamental and
ongoing change might have been unleashed—change that was both a cause and a
consequence of the Cold War’s end. Many concluded that change was driven by the
information revolution, the resulting economic globalization, and human interaction
on a larger scale and at a greater speed than theretofore imagined. Understanding
and managing the dynamics of this new age became a central objective of
foundations, scholars, and practitioners concerned with international security, a
healthy natural environment, and improved quality of life.
Foundation support in these fields has encompassed activities ranging from the
generation of new knowledge to building consensus across political and disciplinary
lines. Discussed below are some of the complementary and often overlapping
strategies for helping new decision-makers to understand and manage change.
A. GENERATING NEW KNOWLEDGE
1. Support for New Concepts and Mechanisms for Governing
In the early s, foundations funded projects designed to help governments think
about and prepare for the kinds of dangers they were likely to confront, ranging from
deliberate acts of aggression to social and environmental collapse. They considered
new “threats” to security and sustainability, the origins of which were spontaneous as
well as organized, indigenous as well as foreign. Foundations financed scholarship
that both examined and sought to anticipate rapid change and provided new concepts
and mechanisms for governing. For example, the concept of “cooperative security,”
which prescribes restraint in the deployments and activities of military organizations,
was developed with the aim of putting self-regulating mechanisms in place to prevent
wars between states and to provide for collective action should war nonetheless
occur.
This work was accompanied by the development of the concept of “human security,”
which advocates investing in sustainable economic development, meeting basic
human needs, and providing for an improved quality of life, so as to create the
conditions for peace within states. The growing belief that the dangers the world
community faced had become too numerous, too varied, too fast-acting, and too
consequential for adequate response led to an emphasis on policies of prevention.
Human security concepts were meant to justify action at the earliest possible stage,
long before a problem festered, spread, and led to a crisis.
A number of foundations have pursued the human security agenda by actively
supporting efforts that serve to strengthen individuals through investments in
 Brookings Institution scholar John D.
Steinbruner was among the first to argue
this point in his writings and advice to
foundations (See “Problems in Strategic
Realignment,” in Is the Atlantic Widening?
Atlantic Area Nations after the Cold War ,
David Hale, et al., (Chicago: Council on
Foreign Relations, ). Others include
Nobel Prize-winning physicist Murray
Gellmann of the Santa Fe Institute, in his
book The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures
in the Simple and the Complex (New York:
W.H. Freeman, ); and historian Paul
Kennedy of Yale University, in his book
Preparing for the Twenty-first Century (New
York: Vintage Books, ).
 See Graham Allison and Gregory F.
Treverton, eds., Rethinking America’s
Security (New York, London: W.W.
Norton & Company, a publication of
The American Assembly, ).
 The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of
New York, and the W. Alton Jones
Foundation supported the early work of
Steinbruner and his Brookings colleagues
in developing the concept of cooperative
security and considering its operational
consequences. The concept was further
developed and applied to the problem of
weapons proliferation by the Carnegie-
supported Cooperative Security Consortium,
comprised of scholars from Brookings,
Harvard’s Center for Science and
International Affairs (CSIA), Stanford’s
Center for International Security and Arms
Control (CISAC), the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace (CEIP), and
Russia’s Institute for the Study of U.S.-
Canada (ISKAN). That effort resulted in a
Brookings-edited volume, Global
Engagement, Janne E. Nolan, editor.
Nolan, now at the Twentieth Century
Fund, and Barry Blechman and Michael
Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center,
continue to explore the operational
consequences and political viability of
cooperative security concepts.
 Foundations supporting the development
of this concept include the John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation,
which funded the Common Security
Forum convened by the Centre for History
and Economics, Kings College,
Cambridge; the Center for Population and
Development Studies, Harvard University;
and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Principal investigators included
Emma Rothschild and Lincoln Chen. The
Pew Global Stewardship Initiative also
provided funding for this project, as did
the Japanese and Swedish governments,
and UNICEF. For a discussion of human
security, see Emma Rothschild, “What is
Security?” Daedalus, vol. , no.  ().
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education and public health, economic development assistance, and the promotion of
human rights. They have advanced women’s education and reproductive health.
Efforts to strengthen individuals and societies by promoting sustainable economic
development have long been carried out by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations.
The Rockefeller Foundation is credited with having fostered the “Green Revolution”
and sustainable agriculture; its president, Gordon Conway, coined the latter term at
an earlier time. The Ford Foundation’s long-term commitment to equity in
economic development has been demonstrated around the globe. The David and
Lucille Packard Foundation has focused its international grant-making on population
stabilization and sustainable resource management.
Foundation-supported scholarship also resulted in new considerations of potential
violence between cultures, such as Harvard scholar Samuel P. Huntington’s article,
“Clash of Civilizations?” His book by that title argued that, with the end of the
bipolar stalemate, conflict is likely to break out along “civilizational” divides. Efforts
by both scholars and policy-makers to further examine this concept and its practical
consequences have been supported by the John M. Olin Foundation, the Lynde and
Harry Bradley Foundation, and the Smith Richardson Foundation; and has attracted
some corporate foundation support.
Whatever their point of view about sources of future authority, stability, or conflict,
an increasing number of scholars have agreed that there has been a fundamental
change in what Reverend J. Bryan Hehir refers to as “the structure of power and
principles of order,” which guide relationships and understandings within and among
states. In  Richard H. Ullman of Princeton University and in  Jessica T.
Mathews, then of the World Resources Institute, wrote forceful articles calling for a
“redefinition” of security, to include nonmilitary threats to human life, social
stability, and political order.
Prominent scholars, like Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School Dean Joseph
S. Nye, Jr., Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Dean Paul C.
Wolfowitz, and former Secretary of Defense and World Bank President Robert S.
McNamara, have written that some important security concerns have not changed,
while opportunities for addressing them may have. The need to pay heed to Great
Power relations and to reduce the nuclear danger remain constant in the Information
Age. Nye and Duke University political scientist Robert Keohane have noted that
the web of relationships created by increasing interdependence among state and non-
state actors has not displaced the nation-state, which remains an important and
resilient source of authority, power, and influence. Military power still plays an
important role, and traditional security concerns continue to take precedence over
other international matters. Nye points out, however, that states have new
opportunities to use their economic and moral suasion to achieve their ends,
including what he terms the “soft power” that stems from greater economic and
cultural interactions among non-state actors across national lines. The resulting
spread of popular culture and the image of the good life the United States represents
create these less tangible sources of influence.
Others have maintained—as have University of Chicago scholar John J. Mearsheimer
and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—that shifts in world politics do not
call for a change in basic strategy. Their “Realist” advocacy of balance-of-power
politics continues. This debate led to much research into the ways in which the
 The  Brundtland Commission Report
defines sustainable development as
“development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet
their own needs.” See the World
Commission on Environment and
Development (WCED) Report,
Our Common Future, .
 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash
of Civilizations and the Remaking of the
World Order (New York: Simon and
Schuster, ).
 See J. Bryan Hehir, “Intervention:
From Theories to Cases,” Ethics and
International Affairs, vol.  (),
pp. –. Also see Hehir’s remarks at the
June  Core Group meeting of the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund Project on
World Security, www.rbf.org/pws
 See Richard H. Ullman, “Redefining
Security,” International Security, vol. ,
no.  (summer ) and Jessica
Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign
Affairs (Spring ).
  See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Conflicts after
the Cold War,” The Washington
Quarterly, vol. , no.  (Winter )
and “The Case for Deep Engagement,”
Foreign Affairs, vol. , no.  (July/
August ); Wolfowitz, “America at
the End of the Century: Problems on
the Horizon,” Current, no.  (June
); and “Bridging Centuries: Fin de
Siecle All Over Again,” The National
Interest, no.  (Spring );
McNamara, “The Nuclear Emperor has
No Clothes,” New Perspectives Quarterly,
vol. , no. .
 See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S.
Nye, Jr., “States and the Information
Revolution,” Foreign Affairs (September/
October ).
 See William Owens and Joseph S. Nye,
Jr., “America’s Information Edge,”
Foreign Affairs (March/April ).
 University of Chicago scholar John J.
Mearsheimer and former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger have both argued
the continued relevance and efficacy of
th-century balance-of-power politics.
The Bush administration’s initial review
of national security policy called for
Astatus quo plus,” reflecting the
widespread assumptions of scholars and
practitioners at the time, reinforced by
the “realist” school of thought. See
Mearsheimer’s “Back to the Future:
Instability in Europe After the Cold
War,” International Security, vol. , no. ,
(Summer ); “The False Promise of
International Institutions,” International
Security, vol. , no.  (Winter /).
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traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty may have been compromised or
challenged and to an ongoing discussion of the relative roles and powers of state and
non-state actors. Much of the discussion has rested on the arguments first laid out in
the late s by Keohane and Nye in their seminal work, Power and
Interdependence.
2. Support for Multidisciplinary Research
Conceptual innovations have often been the products of collaboration across
institutional, disciplinary, and national boundaries. They have included the
Cooperative Security Consortium, the Common Security Forum, and the 
Project, among others. Foundations have also sought to deepen understanding of
political, economic, social, environmental, technological, and traditional security
concerns through support for multidisciplinary programs. The Pew Charitable
Trusts, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, and the John
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundations have been leaders in promoting
interdisciplinary approaches. The latter three have followed explicit strategies of
supporting, and in some cases helping to create, academic “centers of excellence”
where training in cross-disciplinary study is a central mission. Additionally,
MacArthur supports fellowships for multidisciplinary study, both directly and
through the Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC). And the Pew Charitable
Trusts’ Global Security Program provided multi-year support to the Global Security
Fellows Initiative at Cambridge University in England.
While foundations such as the John M. Olin, Smith Richardson, and Lynde and
Harry Bradley have emphasized established traditions in foreign policy analysis and
strategic studies, they have also supported multidisciplinary efforts to come to terms
with a changing world. They are, for example, among those that support the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, which has a multidisciplinary
curriculum and attracts both students and lecturers from around the globe.
At least one intensive effort to describe the consequences of rapid change—the
Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Global Trends  Project—
received primarily corporate support. Another, the Central Intelligence Agency’s
(CIA) State Failure Task Force, was a U.S. government initiative undertaken by
independent scholars from around the country. Moreover, a number of scholars
have applied the analytic tools of one discipline or sector to tracking and
understanding developments in another. This has been the approach of the Sante Fe
Institute, for example, which uses high performance computing for the consideration
of complex interactions among a variety of factors. Also, the United States and the
British intelligence communities and militaries have adopted the use of a corporate
planning tool, known as “scenario-building,” in an effort to better equip policy-
makers for the full range of possibilities for which they must prepare.
 See Paul B. Stares, “The New Security Agenda:
A Global Survey” (Tokyo, Japan: Center for
International Exchange, ). Not all agree that
sovereignty is eroding, pointing out that the ideal
notion of sovereignty attributed to Westphalia has
always been subject to violation or modification.
Stephen D. Krasner is the best known scholar making
this point, and he is writing a book on the topic. The
debate is likely to continue, fueled by disagreements
about whether these global changes will have
beneficial or harmful effects. Some scholars, such as
Richard H. Ullman, have warned of the dangers
associated with weak states in the international system,
arguing that shoring up the state system is the best
defense against modern-day threats to the
international community. Other scholars and analysts
point out that Great Power relations remain central
even in the changing international environment, due
to their sheer power. See Krasner’s “Westphalia and
All That,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert O.
Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, ); “Compromising
Westphalia,” International Security, vol. , no. 
(Winter ); Ullman, The World and Yugoslavia’s
Wars (New York: Council on Foreign Relations,
). Among the spate of new books published on
sovereignty in recent years are Gene Martin Lyons and
Michael Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia?: State
Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, ); Tom Farer,
Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy
in the Americas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, ); The New World Order: Sovereignty,
Human Rights, and the Self-Determination of Peoples
(Oxford and Washington, D.C.: Berg, ); David J.
Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty: Territory and Political
Economy in the Twenty-First Century (Toronto;
Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, ).
 See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power
and Interdependence,World Politics in Transition
(Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company,
).
 For a descriptive compilation of such endeavors, see
the Inventory of Security Projects (New York:
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, ).
 Among them are Stanford University’s Center for
International Security and Arms Control (CISAC),
the John F. Kennedy School’s Center for Science and
International Affairs (CSIA) at Harvard University,
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s
Defense and Arms Control Program (DACs).
 Some specific examples of Olin funding include .
million over three years for the Olin Institute at
Harvard under Samuel P. Huntington’s directorship,
for the Foreign Policy Research Institute in
Philadelphia on avoiding a new cold war with Russia,
and for Carnes Lord’s professorship at Tufts. Smith
Richardson supported the American Enterprise
Institute research project on U.S. Military forces in
the future, various fellowships at several universities, as
well as providing a grant to the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) for a project on
professional military education. Smith Richardson also
gave to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities for
studying the defense budget, to Harvard for broad
studies on U.S. national security policy after the Cold
War and a book on the national interest and national
security by Samuel P. Huntington. The Paul Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of
Johns Hopkins University also received Smith
Richardson support for various projects ranging from
the Center for Central Asian studies to a project on
Russia’s New Security Services and one on
Telecommunications and International Relations.
Princeton also obtained funding for a research
program in international security, and almost , went to Yale’s International Security Studies Program
under the directorship of Paul Kennedy. Finally, The Bradley Foundation gives many fellowships, including those
for graduate students at the department of government and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia, at Princeton
for international studies, to SAIS for fellowships and the Strategic Studies Program generally. SAIS also received
funding for a project on technology in modern warfare, and a book on East Asia and the American National
Interest, as did Harvard for a project on national identity and national interests at the Weatherhead Center, which
also was supported with several Bradley fellowships. Bradley also supports the American Enterprise Institute for
lectureships and programs.
 See Michael J. Mazarr, Global Trends : The Challenge of a New Millennium (Robert R. McCormick Tribune
Foundation, ).
 Scholars include Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Daniel Esty, and Marc Levy, among others.
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3. Examining the Linkages
Multidisciplinary research has provided the basis for foundations, governments, and
corporate funders to support the examination of certain combinations of issues,
seeking to better understand the linkages among them. Pew, for example, created its
Global Stewardship Initiative to explore the security consequences of demographic
shifts and environmental degradation. Carnegie has added a strand to its Peace and
International Security Program to address the problem of conflict over natural
resources such as oil and water. And the Rockefeller Foundation has created a new
program on global dangers, including environmental concerns. Under the rubric of
“environmental security,” this has been a salient line of inquiry, even on the policy
agenda. Experiences in Rwanda, Somalia, and Haiti led many policy makers to
conclude that environmental collapse can be an important contributor to violent
conflict and state failure. This hunch was reinforced by journalistic observations by
Robert Kaplan and is among the topics being examined by the ongoing CIA State
Failure Task Force. In undertaking this initiative, the U.S. government has followed
the lead of foundations in supporting the exploration of the impact on social
cohesion of environmental, social, economic, demographic, and cultural
developments.
While some scholars have sought to demonstrate clear causation between
environmental stress and violent conflict, others have examined linkages among
culture, identity, and security. Others have considered the possible interactions
among economic growth, development, and conflict. New York Times columnist
Thomas L. Friedman has offered his view of the political and social implications of
economic globalization in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Russia in
his regular op-ed pieces and in his book The Lexus and the Olive Tree.
Despite a rich array of research projects, the precise ways in which interacting stresses
such as endemic poverty, overpopulation, environmental degradation, resource
scarcity, infectious disease, and mass migration affect the outbreak of violent conflict
are still not apparent.The research carried out over the past decade has been rich and
varied. It has failed, however, to identify the “tipping point” at which these dynamics
combine to undermine the capacity of societies to govern or of nature to provide.
There are at least four reasons for this:
• The first is that in most cases, the path is indirect. Deforestation, for example,
is unlikely to be the single, direct cause of violence, although its
consequences—soil erosion, reduced agricultural output, and hunger—could
lead to famine, disease, or migration to cities, which could then trigger a violent
response by the population.
• Second, the causes of violent conflict tend to be multiple and highly contextual.
For instance, under some conditions environmental problems lead to violence.
Under others, however, they do not. Political and social conditions matter, and
sound governance—local, national, and international—appears to make the
difference between these outcomes.
• The third reason is that some of the underlying causes of conflict are often
masked by their political or social expression. Environmental problems, for
example, often surface as social or economic problems.
 Inspired by such intellectual leaders as Mathews,
Holdren, Kennedy, Steinbruner and others,
several younger scholars have devoted their
research to these relationships, and to
determining whether causal links can clearly be
established. Scholars working in this vein include
Thomas Homer-Dixon, Michael Renner, Marc
Levy, Daniel Esty, and Peter Gleick, among
others. Their findings are published in
established academic journals and are often
summarized in The Environmental Change and
Security Project Report of the Woodrow Wilson
Center, wwics.si.edu (E-mail: csheehan@
sivm.si.edu).
 For an assessment of the literature on
environment and security, see Geoffrey D.
Dabelko and P.J. Simmons, “Environment and
Security: Core Ideas and U.S. Government
Initiatives,” SAIS Review, vol. , no.  (Winter-
Spring ); on changes in the study of security,
see Ann M. Florini and P.J. Simmons, The New
Security Thinking: A Review of the North
American Literature (New York: Rockefeller
Brothers Fund, ). On environmental
security, see Thomas Homer-Dixon, “On the
Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of
Acute Conflict,” International Security, vol. ,
no.  (). For the U.S. government’s approach
to “environmental security,” see the National
Security Science and Technology Strategy and the
National Security Strategy.
 Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy: How
Scarcity, Crime, Over-population, Tribalism,
and Disease are rapidly Destroying the Social
Fabric of Our Planet,” Atlantic Monthly, vol. ,
no.  (February, ); and The Ends of the Earth:
A Journey at the Dawn of the st Century (New
York: Random House, ).
 Thomas Homer-Dixon, of the University of
Toronto, has done extensive and rigorous work
in this area. For an overview of the research on
environment and security, see Dabelko and
Simmons, “Environment and Security”; see also
Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold.”
 MacArthur, Olin, Smith Richardson and others
have supported investigation into the
relationships among culture, identity, and
security. The Social Science Research Council,
through its fellowship program, has sponsored
significant research in this area with support from
the MacArthur Foundation. For a review of the
literature, see Amir Pasic, Culture, Identity, and
Security (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund,
) and on www.rbf.org/pws.
 Pew supported an examination of trade,
economics, and security through its Public Policy
Program. For reviews of the literature in the areas
of economic development, globalization, and
political stability, see Joan M. Nelson, Poverty,
Inequality, and Conflict in Developing Countries
(New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, );
Nicolas van de Walle, Economic Globalization
and Political Stability in Developing Countries
(New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, );
and Ernest J. Wilson III, Globalization,
Information Technology, and Conflict in the
Second and Third Worlds: A Critical Review of the
Literature (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund,
) and on www.rbf.org/pws.
 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive
Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, ).
 See remarks of Allan Hammond at the
September  meeting of the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund Project on World Security Core
Group, www.rbf.org/pws.
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• Fourth, the tipping point may come with the introduction of a subjective
variable, which is difficult to measure. It may come, some argue, when the
perception of inequity becomes widespread. Whereas measuring inequality is
straightforward, it is harder to measure inequity—a feeling that results from the
combination of global and local circumstance, which takes hold for different
reasons at different stages, depending on culture and timing. Some argue that
perceptions of unfairness may become more widespread when information is
more widely held, and both political and economic conditions are in flux.
These are the conditions of the current age.
Four efforts to identify the point at which change leads to violence or societal collapse
have been helpful to this inquiry. However, their authors make no claims that their
results are either complete or conclusive. The State Failure Task Force has examined a
number of variables in order to understand their contribution to state collapse. The
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict has looked at a variety of
contributors to mass violence. The former found that lack of material well-being and
nonparticipation in the international economic order were key variables. The latter
found that deprivation and discrimination combined to prompt violent conflict.
A third initiative, undertaken by Thomas Homer-Dixon and his University of
Toronto colleagues, has taken a series of case studies of violent conflicts—such as
Rwanda and Chiapas, Mexico—and considered the ways in which resource pressures
may have interacted with political and social stresses. The University of Toronto team
has since begun measuring the impact of and requirements for human “ingenuity”—
or the role of indigenous knowledge—in steadying an otherwise fragile state. The
fourth effort, launched by the Brookings Institute/Johns Hopkins University Center
on Social and Economic Dynamics, is working backward from both conflicts and
non-conflicts, to determine why different outcomes occur in situations that might, at
first glance, appear quite similar, and how social conditions within societies affect
these different outcomes.
Recently, efforts have been made to draw together the many strands that fall within
the “redefining security” debate first launched by Professor Ullman in . The
literature frequently offers a picture of the kaleidoscope’s pieces in motion—all a
jumble, with no clear image to see or design to comprehend. At moments a pattern
emerges, only to give way to yet another. In such a time of change, traditional
measures of success or failure may not apply to a foundation program or a funded
project. Capturing change in motion once, twice, and yet again will only prove useful
over time, and the inquiry is still young.
During the early and mid-s, several promising projects failed to gain enough
financial support or academic interest to be sustained. Some aspired to a policy
consensus the basis for which did not, and does not yet, exist. The principal
investigators did not meet their own ambitious goals, nor those of their funders. In
one case, a foundation rescinded a substantial grant. Nonetheless, in important
ways, these were not failures. Each provided insights and inspired others to join a
nascent debate on the nature of security and sustainability in a new age.
4. Applying the Knowledge: New Policy Ideas and Mechanisms
Foundations have played a key role in supporting efforts to develop new policy ideas
and mechanisms and to advance consideration of these innovations among policy-
makers. The Carnegie Corporation’s Cooperative Security Consortium and the
 See remarks of John Steinbruner at the
April  meeting of the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund Project on World
Security Core Group, www.rbf.org/pws.
 For example, the Japan Center for
International Exchange has held
workshops and commissioned a series of
regionally focused literature reviews. The
Aspen Institute sponsored a series of
conferences intended to strengthen the
international community’s capacity to
address new challenges and to build a
consensus on approaches to security
among a diverse group including
political and financial leaders, scholars,
and journalists. The Stimson Center and
Overseas Development Council
conducted a similar review with Ford
Foundation support. The Council on
Foreign Relations sponsored a project
intended to help develop a broad
consensus about how recent changes
affect national security. These projects
where funded by, among others, the Pew
Charitable Trusts, the Ford Foundation,
and the Rockefeller Family Fund.
 Pew Charitable Trusts rescinded a
multi-year grant in the early s.
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Rockefeller Foundation’s North Korea Initiative are two important examples of
projects that helped develop and apply novel approaches to contemporary policy
problems. A third example, in the environmental field, is the advancement of “joint
implementation” as a means of achieving the objectives of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change.
The principal investigators of the Cooperative Security Consortium regularly briefed
U.S. Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) on their findings,
leading to a partnership that resulted in the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Act, a policy innovation which committed taxpayer dollars to drawing
down former Soviet military forces. This policy tool is a key example of a new trend,
described by former Defense Secretary William J. Perry as a strategy of “preventive
defense.” The strategy aims to protect U.S. interests through multilateral action and
by cooperatively financing or directly carrying out tasks that reduce threats emanating
from abroad. In the case of the Nunn-Lugar program, former Soviet warheads were
separated from missiles and transported to secure Russian sites by U.S. corporate
contractors who were paid out of the federal defense budget. Those sites have been
rendered more secure by technical experts from the U.S. Department of Energy and
the Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos National Laboratories.
A second example of “preventive defense” in action is the decision by the U.S.,
Japanese, and South Korean governments to provide North Korea with fuel oil and
light water reactors for nuclear power generation in exchange for agreement to close
down the North Korean nuclear weapons program and submit to international
safeguards in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Significantly, this too was in part enabled by foundation-supported activity. The
Rockefeller Foundation supported a number of efforts at back-channel, or Track II,
diplomacy, including a visit by former President Jimmy Carter, which revealed a
willingness on North Korea’s part to resolve the crisis in this manner. Secretary
Perry describes “preventive defense” as an operational expression of the concept of
“cooperative security” mentioned above.
The notion of one state operating within the borders of another or financing such
efforts in order to fulfill its governance responsibilities is reflected in yet another
policy innovation, known as joint implementation. Through this mechanism, the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change allows wealthy countries
to meet their required cuts in emissions of greenhouse gases by reducing emissions in
less-developed countries.
Other foundation efforts to export knowledge have included the sharing and
dissemination of “best practices.” The Ford Foundation in particular has focused on
distilling the strategies or policies that have proven successful in one arena,
transferring them to another geographic or functional area. One of the most
celebrated and successful initiatives that gave momentum to the notion of sharing
best practices was micro-lending. Its success in Bangladesh with the Grameen Bank
has spread globally and has even been adopted as a method for alleviating poverty in
the developed world. In recent years, American First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton
has brought media attention to this economic tool, in an example of a political leader
seeking to encourage nongovernmental actors and to help others learn from them.
Similarly, many conflict prevention and resolution initiatives adopted or encouraged
 Perry and former Assistant Secretary of
Defense Ashton B. Carter co-direct the
Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense
Project, a joint venture of the two
universities. In a forthcoming book, they
explain their concept and make
recommendations for U.S. defense
policy. By engaging Stanford scholar
Perry, Harvard scholar Carter, and
ISKAN scholar Andrei Kokoshin in the
Cooperative Security Consortium,
Carnegie was able to involve those who
would later be responsible for
implementing the Nunn-Lugar program
within both the U.S. and Russian
ministries of defense.
 For a detailed description of events
leading to the North Korean “framework
agreement,” see Leon V. Sigal,
Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy
with North Korea (Princeton, N.J.: ).
 While debates continue on the wisdom
or relevance of conceptual innovations,
former Defense Secretary William J.
Perry and former Assistant Secretary of
Defense Ashton B. Carter have begun a
series of books outlining the ways in
which they applied cooperative security
concepts while in office. Adding to the
power of their persuasion is the
contribution of young scholars such as
Harvard and Oxford-educated Elizabeth
Sherwood-Randall, who also served in
the Pentagon. Their Preventive Defense
Project has invited others of stature and
imagination—such as former National
Security Advisor and Air Force General
Brent Scowcroft, former Chair of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili,
former Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs
Admiral William Owens, and former
Senetor Sam Nunn—to join in the effort
to apply a model that works for today’s
problems. The combination of young
scholars and established leaders can
contribute to a larger consensus. Part of
their Stanford/Harvard Project on
Preventive Defense are active efforts to
encourage China to define its security
goals in ways that are compatible with
those of its neighbors and other Great
Powers. See Perry and Carter, The
Content of U.S. Engagement with China;
A Special report of the Preventive Defense
Project (California: by the Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University and the Board of Trustees of
Harvard University, ).
 Among the concerns about the financial
crisis that swept Asia in  was that the
Grameen Bank suffered heavy losses,
threatening continued “micro-lending.”
  Many relief organizations, like CARE,
are engaged in conflict prevention and
management. Other organizations like
the Washington DC-based Search for
Common Ground or the Boston-based
Conflict Management Group have been
active in this arena as well.
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by states are built on models that CSOs have tested and shown to be effective. And
efforts by CSOs like the Nautilus and the Rocky Mountain Institutes to offer energy
alternatives to North Korea and China may pave the way for future
intergovernmental cooperation.
Another project applying the lessons of one arena to another is being carried out by
University of Virginia scholar Philip Zelikow. His experience as a former National
Security Council staff-member, a Texas prosecutor, and as a political scientist
prompted him to seek a “third way” of policing in societies fraught by internal
conflict, such as Northern Ireland or Palestine. His findings reflect recent
experience—both successful and not—and will be useful to those responsible for the
civil administration of states torn by civil war, such as the former Yugoslavia.
Foundations rightly focus on those problems that are likely to arise for which
solutions are urgently needed. Professor Zelikow’s project is illustrative of the policy-
relevant research carried out in universities and think tanks around the world.
5. Support for Interaction Among Policy-Makers and Independent Experts
Foundations that have shifted their gaze to transnational issues are both influencing
and influenced by the think tanks, academic institutions, and activists they support,
and they reflect many of the concerns of policy-makers. Their support of policy-
relevant research is essential to expanding the options available to governments and to
creating the talent pool upon which governments draw.
Several foundations have sought to advance both new ideas and new methods of
analysis by systematically engaging policy-makers and elected officials in discussions
with scholars and activists. In the late s and early s, the Carnegie
Corporation and the W. Alton Jones Foundation supported a Washington dinner
series to discuss long-term “Security Options” among their grantees and officials from
the legislative and executive branches of government. MacArthur and Carnegie have
supported Congressional seminars convened by former Senator Dick Clark of the
Aspen Institute, in which U.S. and other legislators and scholars devote a week to the
discussion of issues relating to U.S.-Russian relations, China’s future, the global
environment, or the transition to post-apartheid South Africa. These foundations and
others have supported the Aspen Strategy Group, an annual, week-long session of
current, past, and likely future senior officials to discuss papers put forth by
outstanding scholars with area and functional expertise. Consortia like the Common
Security Forum and the Cooperative Security Consortium were comprised of an
international grouping of policy-makers and scholars. These are just some of the ways
in which foundations have supported interaction and collaboration among state and
non-state actors.
Foundations have also used their own convening authority to promote discussion and
collaboration among scholars, activists, and governmental policy-makers. For
example, several foundations are now working closely with representatives of the
World Bank, the United Nations, and other multilateral organizations not only to
improve communication among policy-makers and independent analysts, but also to
identify new ways of doing business. Foundations are in a position to urge action,
for example, on the State Failure Task Force’s recommendation that there be better
collection of environmental and census data worldwide.
 Energy experts Amory and Hunter
Lovins of the Colorado-based Rocky
Mountain Institute have been advising
Chinese officials on ways to meet their
energy needs while minimizing the
environmental impact. Private sector
energy experts Roger Sant of AES
Corporation and William Chandler of
Battelle are also among those advising
the Chinese on sustainable development
models.
 This project was first created by the late
Gerard Smith, Jane Wales, and Morton
Halperin under the auspices of the
Center for Nuclear War Education of
the New York and Washington-based
Fund for Peace. It was later was
convened by William Lanouette and
Steven Wolf at the Henry L. Stimson
Center. In both incarnations, it was
supported by the Carnegie Corporation
and the W. Alton Jones Foundation.
 This undertaking is also carried out under
the umbrella of the Aspen Institute,
headquartered in Washington, D.C.
 Through a project at the Aspen Institute
called the Global Interdependence
Initiative, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund
and several other U.S.-based foundations
have been pooling resources to advance
U.S. public understanding of the reality
and consequences of global
interdependence.
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B. SUPPORT FOR STATE ACTORS
By financing the scholarship and creating the talent pool upon which governments
draw, foundations have helped to expand policy options and strengthen the efficacy
of governments. They have done so both in the developed and the developing world.
Recognizing the importance of the virtues of accountability, transparency, and agility
in an era characterized by change, foundations have also supported efforts to build
democratic institutions. The Ford Foundation has backed programs to draft
constitutions and train independent judiciaries throughout the world. The Carnegie
Corporation has sought to strengthen democratic institutions ranging from popularly
elected legislatures to the media, and has focused on the role of the military in
emerging democracies. The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation has supported
efforts to build capacity for conflict prevention and management on the local as well
as national and regional levels. And financier George Soros’s many Open Society
Institutes have helped promote openness in governance in the former Soviet sphere.
Foundation support for collaboration among governmental institutions and officials
with like responsibilities, across state lines, has been so pervasive and so effective over
the years that Harvard legal scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued that a new
transgovernmental order is emerging. According to Slaughter, the state is
disaggregating into functionally separate parts, including courts, regulatory agencies,
and legislatures. These distinct entities join with their counterparts abroad, forming
networks that can collaboratively seek to address transnational problems.
In recent years, research institutes and private individuals have also recognized the
need to encourage and augment government efforts to train personnel in the
principles of democratic governance, as well as for the tasks of enforcing international
regulations. One example is the program to train nonproliferation specialists in the
former Soviet Union and China, particularly in the area of export control
implementation established by the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies. Another is the Chinese Generals
Program at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, which is funded by a
Hong Kong businesswoman. Notably, she chose to initiate this program because of
the success of a similar foundation-funded program to train Russian officers at the
Kennedy School. The Carnegie Corporation, the MacArthur Foundation, and the
W. Alton Jones Foundation are all investing in formalized contact among military
bureaucracies.
Foundations are also seeking to improve governance by addressing the decline in trust
in public institutions and by identifying the most important trends affecting
governments. The Kennedy School’s Vision in Governance Project has initiated a
public conversation to develop appropriate responses to, and new ways of thinking
about, governance as well as the expectations citizens have of their governments. The
Project also focuses attention on new paradigms for national security policy and social
policy, as well as on the means for improving the management and measurement of
governance needs and capacities.
Many foundations have selected certain geographic areas as a way of concentrating
their efforts. The end of the Cold War and the end of apartheid in South Africa
presented foundations with new opportunities to support and encourage societies in
transition, provide a safety net, and limit reliance on the use of force. The William
  See Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Real
New World Order,” Foreign Affairs, vol.
, no.  (Fall ). The Carnegie
Corporation, under the leadership of its
president, Vartan Gregorian, has
identified strengthening democracy as a
central theme that will cut across its
domestic and international programs.
The Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller
Foundation, MacArthur, the Carnegie
Corporation, and the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund have all devoted
significant funds to strengthening
democratic governance. This has long
been a goal of the Ford Foundation, for
example, in the developing world. The
Rockefeller Brothers Fund has sought to
build and strengthen emerging
democratic institutions in East Central
Europe, East Asia, South Africa, and
Latin America. And an important strand
of the Carnegie Corporation’s grant-
making in former Warsaw Pact countries
has fallen under the rubric of
“Strengthening Democratic
Institutions.” An aspect of strengthening
democratic governance also has included
support for watch-dog organizations,
which monitor the policies and actions
of governments and intergovernmental
organizations. The human rights
community, for example, has received
support for this purpose from a wide
range of foundations, as have the
nonproliferation community and
environmental organizations. Grantee
organizations such as the University of
Georgia’s Center for International Trade
and Security seek to strengthen
international regimes by monitoring the
effectiveness of their associated
international institutions. Others, like
the Center on International Cooperation
at New York University, aim to
strengthen multilateral institutions by
identifying ways to improve internal
governance and financing.
 This training program was funded by
several foundations, including the
Carnegie Corporation, the Ford
Foundation, and the W. Alton Jones
Foundation. It is only one facet of
Monterey’s research program; others
include the International Organizations
and Non-Proliferation Project;
Monitoring Proliferation Threats; the
Program for Arms Control, Disarmament
and Conversion; the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation
Project; and the East Asia Non-
Proliferation Project. The center also
receives funding from the U.S.
Government.
 The Chinese program is part of the Nina
Kung Initiative at the Kennedy School;
its goal is to advance the principle of
civilian control of the military. The
Russian generals program, on which it is
modeled, has received significant
Carnegie Corporation support. Both are
designed and carried out by Robert
Blackwill, a senior director of the
National Security Council in the Bush
Administration.
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and Flora Hewlett Foundation has developed a special interest in Latin America. The
Carnegie Corporation’s charter has long focused its attention on British
Commonwealth countries in Africa. Carnegie has also concentrated on the successor
states of the Soviet Union and has a new interest in Central Asia. The Rockefeller
Brothers Fund’s traditional areas of concern have included East Asia, East Central
Europe, South Africa, and New York City. The Ford, MacArthur, and Rockefeller
Foundations tend to be global in their orientation. However, even these global
players can point to areas they have emphasized or periods in which they became
more focused on a certain region. The Rockefeller Foundation, after its work on the
Green Revolution, has continued its activities in the developing world. Ford has seen
Africa as a major concern. And MacArthur has become particularly active in the
former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War. Several foundations supported
Yale historian Paul Kennedy’s development of a theoretic “pivotal states” strategy for
the U.S. government to focus its development dollars on those states whose stability
is central to the stability of the region they inhabit. While those foundations do not
claim to adhere to that policy, in practice funding and staffing limitations often
mandate clear geographic foci. The same is true for governments, including the U.S.
C. SUPPORT FOR NON-STATE ACTORS
In recognition that an accountable and stable state is the political unit best equipped
to protect the basic rights and provide for the security of individuals and groups, the
targets of foundation efforts have often been states. However, funding has gone to
independent experts and nongovernmental organizations that strengthen state
capacity by enhancing the transparency, accountability, and efficacy of governmental
institutions. This has included efforts to bring to light previously secret governmental
decisions and the processes that led to them. Furthermore, foundation leaders firmly
subscribe to the notion that a robust civil society is fundamental to a functioning
democratic state. Support for civil society organizations and their interaction with
counterparts around the world has been a staple of foundation strategies for decades.
Many large foundations have funded nongovernmental think tanks that have
generated alternative analyses of economic and security issues so that neither policy-
makers nor citizens would have to rely solely on governmental perspectives of issues
that are technically complex or shrouded in secrecy. Ford, MacArthur, and Carnegie
have supported “centers of excellence” where arms control issues are considered at
universities such as Harvard, Stanford, and MIT. Foundations have also begun to
support the creation of similar institutions in other countries where they perceive a
need for an independent voice in the security realm. One example is the Moscow
Center of the Carnegie Endowment, which supports independent Russian scholars
and policy analysts.
They have also supported collaboration among “agents of change” or social
entrepreneurs who are setting local, national, and international agendas. Important
examples of such key actors include transnational epistemic communities, such as the
science and technology community. For over forty years, foundations have supported
the Nobel Prize-winning International Pugwash Conferences on Science and World
Affairs, an international gathering of scientists concerned about issues related to
weapons of mass destruction. In the early s, the Carnegie Corporation launched
its Commission on Science, Technology and Government, which examined the many
 Foundations publish their guidelines in
hard copy and on-line, including a
description of their geographic areas of
concentration.
 See Paul M. Kennedy, The Pivotal
States: A New Framework for US Policy
in the Developing World (New York:
W.W. Norton & Co., ).
 A number of organizations within the
United States and elsewhere promote
transparency in foreign policy decision-
making. An outstanding example is the
National Security Archives of the Fund
for Peace, which uses the Freedom of
Information Act to seek the
declassification of government
documents. It publishes those
documents, along with an analysis of
related issues and events. Other
contributions come in the form of
“living histories,” such as the efforts by
Brown University scholar James Blight
to convene key decision-makers in the
Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam
conflict to review and discuss the
conditions, beliefs, and thought
processes that guided their actions (See
James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and
David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink:
Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet
Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books,
). A third approach is pursued by
organizations that provide a forum and
legal representation for government
“whistle blowers,” who publicly criticize
or challenge decisions taken by their
agency.
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ways in which the science and technology community interacts with the policy world
and made recommendations on ways to enhance society’s benefits from this
interaction. At the same time, the Corporation’s Human Resources in Developing
Countries program focused its resources on indigenous African scientific
communities and African women; its Program on Cooperative Security had as a
specific goal the strengthening of the science and technology community in the
Soviet Union and its successor states
After Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the mid-s, Carnegie joined the W.
Alton Jones and MacArthur foundations in supporting a group of U.S. and Soviet
scientists that served as a brain trust to the Soviet president, developing options for
nuclear arms control and disarmament. All three foundations supported the Natural
Resources Defense Council’s path-breaking experimentation with verification
techniques. And several foundations have provided funding for the National
Academy of Sciences and its collaboration with counterparts abroad. After the fall of
Communism, both the Soros network of foundations and MacArthur provided
steady support to scientists in the former Soviet Union, although Soros’s
International Science Foundations recently have been phased out. The U.S.
Government used Nunn-Lugar funds to create the Moscow-based Civilian Research
and Development Foundation to finance civilian research by scientists from the
Russian military establishment. That funding has been augmented by smaller
contributions from both Carnegie and MacArthur.
Foundations have supported efforts to link scientists, CSO activists, and government
officials in various informal ways as well. The Rockefeller Foundation has
contributed to such pragmatic endeavors, especially through efforts to establish and
nurture informal and Track II contacts in areas where the presence of nuclear
weapons capabilities may exacerbate potential tensions. These efforts are intended
both to prepare the ground for official cooperation and, more generally, to expand
and improve communication across borders.
This support has coincided with efforts by governments, such as the United States, to
augment or replace traditional aid programs with the establishment of bilateral
science and technology foundations in places as diverse as India, Russia, and Mexico.
The Clinton administration set out the U.S.’s first coherent strategy of
comprehensive science and technology cooperation with countries whose success was
central to the stability of their region in a document entitled “The National Security
Science and Technology Strategy.” In doing so, it linked its security and sustainable
economic development agendas. What is notable about recent foundation efforts,
however, is that the rationale of a “human security” suggests a more coherent and
conscious strategy. And the widespread recognition of the science and technology
community’s role has made this approach more pervasive among foundations and
U.S. government agencies.
But scientists are not the only “agents of change” attracting foundation and
government funding. Those in the economic development field note that women are
the engines of economic growth throughout the developing world. Carnegie
Corporation’s attention to the status of women in Africa reflects this understanding.
And foundations concerned about population stabilization have devoted funds to
advancing women’s education and supporting international networks of women.
 For Commission publications, see
www.carnegie.org.
 Scientists worked together under the
auspices of the Federation of American
Scientists and the Committee of Soviet
Scientists for Peace and Against the
Nuclear Threat. Among the lead
organizers was Princeton physicist Frank
von Hippel, who later helped devise the
U.S. government’s approach to securing
nuclear weapons material in the former
Soviet Union as Assistant Director of the
White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy in the Clinton
Administration. Assisting him was
Matthew Bunn, now at Harvard’s
Kennedy School.
 Recognizing the role of the scientific
community in promoting social,
political, and economic reform, the
Carnegie Corporation, the Soros
Foundations Network, and the
MacArthur Foundation have funded
projects in the former Soviet Union
which support scientists and engineers,
as well as projects which devise and carry
out plans for defense conversion and
sustainable economic development.
 Both the Carnegie Corporation and the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund have funded
the Institute for East-West Studies’
TransCarpathia Project, designed to
promote economic development and
cross-border cooperation in the
Carpathian Mountain region of Poland,
Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and
Ukraine.
 The U.S. government recently created
the U.S.-Russian Civilian Research and
Development (R&D) Foundation and
the U.S.-Ukrainian R&D Foundation.
The Soros group emphasized
strengthening the scientific community
in the former Soviet Union, creating a
small direct grants program in the
former Soviet Union. And Soros
matched the U.S. government’s
contribution to the U.S.-Russian
Civilian R&D Foundation. George
Perkovich of the W. Alton Jones
Foundation now argues for an
independent scientific voice in states like
India and Pakistan, one which would
call for a reduction of the nuclear danger
and spell out ways for doing so, much as
the U.S. and Soviet communities did
during Gorbachev’s era.
 The U.S. government’s  National
Security Science and Technology
Strategy advanced the view that
sustainable development abroad
promotes national security and
economic prosperity at home. See
www.whitehouse.gov/White_House/
EOP/OSTP/nssts. The document is
offered in hard copy by the United
States Government Printing Office.
 The Packard, Rockefeller, Hewlett, and
MacArthur foundations are among
them.
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The labor and human rights movements have also received steady support and can
claim significant international policy impact. Funding for their efforts has come from
the Ford, Olin, Smith Richardson, Bradley, and MacArthur foundations, and the
Soros Foundations Network, among others. The Soros group has established a well-
developed rationale for its efforts to nurture open societies by arguing that openness is
integral to the flow of knowledge needed to adapt and improve the quality of
governance within and among all human associations.
D. SUPPORT FOR INDIGENOUS PHILANTHROPY
Furthermore, in recognition that philanthropy itself has increased in importance due
to the relative decline of the state, some foundations and individual donors are
working to encourage indigenous philanthropy in countries around the globe. The
United States government is also establishing regionally focused foundations to carry
out programs designed to build and strengthen civil society abroad. However,
funding for such efforts is meager and often represents a reduction in overall U.S.
financial and technical support for building capacity overseas.
Finally, foundations have sought to strengthen non-state actors through awards that
bring international recognition to their achievements, as well as providing needed
funds to further their work. The Nobel Committee has awarded its Peace Prize to
Amnesty International, Pugwash, the International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear War (IPPNW), and the leadership of the movement to ban anti-personnel
land mines, for example. The Goldman Environmental Prize, offered by the Richard
and Rhoda Goldman Foundation, is another example, as are the fellowships—known
as “genius awards”—granted by the MacArthur Foundation. In all three cases, the
awardees are thoroughly vetted by an international network of experts. The Carnegie
Corporation is planning its own program of individual fellowships.
E. SUPPORT FOR TRANSNATIONAL REGIMES
Through support for state and non-state actors, foundations have played key roles in
advancing regimes to address global problems with practical and positive effect. In the
s, foundations supported the environmental and anti-nuclear movements, which
led to the Clean Air Act and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. In the s, philanthropic
attention turned to the Nuclear Weapons Freeze campaign, which led to strategic
arms reductions (START) and the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). More recently, foundations have supported groups that have promoted the
advancement of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), the United Nations Framework Convention on
Global Climate Change (FCCC), and the Montreal Protocol.
Recently, several foundations supported organizations involved in the campaign to
ban land mines. Those citizen groups were recognized with the awarding of the
Nobel Peace Prize to one of their leaders, Jodie Williams. And efforts to eliminate
nuclear weapons have been supported by foundations such as W. Alton Jones,
MacArthur, and Rockefeller, as well as the Carnegie Corporation and the
Ploughshares Fund. Their grantees have been similarly collaborative, coordinating
their activities through the Committee on Nuclear Policy, housed in and staffed by
the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C.
 See, for example, George Soros, “The
Capitalist Threat,” Atlantic Monthly ,
no. , pp. –.
 The Rockefeller Brothers Fund has
helped to convene new philanthropists
in Asia to share best practices. Other
grant-makers have created foundations
abroad. This has not always been
smooth sailing. In the early s, a
group of U.S. grant-makers created an
international foundation to develop
intellectual ties with reformers in what
was then the Soviet Union. To the
disappointment of its patrons, the
International Foundation for the
Survival and Development of Humanity
carried out its business in a sometimes
capricious and secretive fashion,
reflecting the norms of the Soviet elite.
This experience may be a warning that
democratic institutions cannot be fully
formed in an undemocratic state. It also
underscores the advantage of a
foundation’s on-the-ground presence
when investing overseas. Grant-makers
with their own programs in the Soviet
Union—such as MacArthur—had
greater success directly managing grant-
making. And once communism
collapsed and democracy was embraced,
financier George Soros’s Open Society
Institutes (OSIs) were able to thrive as
models of transparency throughout the
former Warsaw Pact nations. The
Civilian R&D Foundation in Russia has
been similarly successful.
 These include the U.S.-Russian Civilian
R&D Foundation and the Baltic-
American Partnership Fund, mentioned
above, and the Congressionally-funded
Eurasia Foundation.
 These included the Rockefeller
Foundation and the Ploughshares Fund,
among others.
 A listing of their grantees is available at
www.stimson.org/policy/members.htm.
 ADVANCING  STABILITY  IN  AN  ERA  OF  CHANGE
A project aimed at understanding transnational policy challenges is the Carnegie
Endowment’s project on Managing Global Issues convened by P.J. Simmons and
supported by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and others. Its goals are to compare
transnational mechanisms and policies over a range of global issues in order to
identify lessons from each area and to evaluate whether they are applicable elsewhere;
to build a network of scholars who examine global issues; and to share the results with
both scholars and policy-makers in order to strengthen both practice and research in
this area.
F. INTERNAL RESTRUCTURING AND
ADAPTATION IN U.S.-BASED FOUNDATIONS
Foundations based in the United States have adapted their own programs and
internal structures to reflect new global conditions, while sustaining support for the
study and management of ongoing problems. Some foundations, such as the Ford
Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, have merged
previously separate programs and identified cross-cutting themes, in recognition of
the breakdown of barriers between domestic and international issues and the need for
an integrated approach to the goals of security, sustainability, and improved quality
of life. Like the MacArthur Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund has treated
security and sustainability as mutually reinforcing goals to be promoted and pursued
in targeted regions of the globe where it has a traditional interest or the issues appear
most salient. The Ford and Rockefeller foundations take advantage of their strong
and historic presence on the ground, working through regional field offices staffed by
outstanding area and functional experts. The Rockefeller Foundation has created a
new program to advance understanding of global issues. And the Carnegie
Corporation has developed a new strand of grant-making devoted to the “new
dimensions of security.” It has also identified the cross-cutting goal of advancing
democracy to be applied to its education, economic development, and peace and
security programs. At the same time, the assets of foundations such as Packard have
grown substantially, prompting a reexamination of programs. The restructuring of
foundation programs and restatement of goals mirrors changes within the U.S.
government structure as well as official statements. In the mid-s, issues such as
crime, drugs, health, and the environment, which had previously been treated as
domestic policy concerns, fell under the purview of the National Security Council
staff and were cited as central themes in the Clinton administration’s National
Security Strategy document and its National Security Science and Technology
Strategy. The notion of transnational issues, actors, and concerns had become a part
of the thinking and planning of governments, foundations, and the intellectual
leaders with whom they interact.
While some grant-making institutions have found advantage in broadening their
focus, others have chosen to narrow the lens, giving singular attention to a clear and
concrete objective, such as the reduction of the nuclear danger, stemming weapons
proliferation, or identifying and addressing other direct threats to security in
particular conflict-ridden regions of the world, such as the Middle East, South Asia,
or the Korean Peninsula. They have dedicated a portion of their grant-making to
the support of scholars, activists, and organizations with expertise in, and a
commitment to these issues. In some cases, they have supported coalitions among
like-minded institutions and individuals working toward a common goal. Other
 The Ford Foundation has placed the
previously autonomous International
Affairs Program under its Peace and Social
Justice category. The John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation has
recently merged its separate population,
peace and security, and conservation
programs into one program with cross-
cutting themes. Importantly, both
maintain their interest in the control of
advanced weapons. And Ford has
supported efforts to contain the light
weapons trade.
 Both foundations have worked to alleviate
poverty. The Ford Foundation also seeks to
promote peace, the rule of law, human
rights, and individual freedoms.
 Both documents are published by the
United States Government Printing Office
and are available on the White House
home page. The National Security Strategy
is updated and submitted to Congress
annually. The Clinton administration’s
 National Security Science and
Technology Strategy was the country’s first,
and was the result of an interagency
process, which also engaged independent
scholars from around the country. It can be
found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
White_House/EOP/OSTP/nssts/html/
nssts.html. Undersecretary of State
Timothy Wirth spoke frequently to the
importance of sustainable economic
development while in office. He is now
president of the United Nations
Foundation.
 The W. Alton Jones Foundation is a leader
in this field. At a time when other
foundations showed a declining interest in
issues relating to nuclear weapons and
nuclear war, it has expanded its support for
individuals and organizations committed to
reducing the nuclear danger. For a listing
of its current grantees, see www.wajones.org.
The Ploughshares Fund has also
maintained its commitment to this issue.
 Among those concerned with the
proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction are the W. Alton Jones
Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation,
the MacArthur Foundation, the Ford
Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation and
the Ploughshares Fund. While they have
maintained their interest in the issue,
others have not, and the overall funding for
nonproliferation efforts has fallen off at a
time when the risk of proliferation appears
to have risen.
 Among these are the Olin Foundation, the
Smith Richardson Foundation, the Bradley
Foundation, the Joyce Mertz Gilmore
Foundation, and the Rockefeller
Foundation, all of which have supported
research on regional threats to security.
 The Nuclear Policy Committee, supported
by the W. Alton Jones Foundation and
housed at the Henry L. Stimson Center,
provides a model for systematic
consultation among grantee organizations
and individual scholars. In some cases,
foundation officers suggest or require such
cooperation as a condition for funding.
More often, the grantees themselves choose
to work closely together and seek funding
to support that collaboration.
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foundations have chosen to pool their resources, creating re-granting mechanisms for
specific purposes. The Global Interdependence Initiative launched by the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund and others is a current example. Some foundations have conducted
reviews or studies designed to better understand the nature of threats to peace and
stability, to evaluate options for addressing these threats, and to identify grant-
making priorities. Others have supported similar studies carried out by grantee
organizations and research groups. The Carnegie Corporation, by creating its
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in parallel with a grant-making program,
has done both, providing intellectual leadership and attracting media attention, as
well as providing financial support for independent study, analysis, and
experimentation.
The establishment of the United Nations Foundation by media executive Ted Turner
is an important development as well: an example of a private actor stepping into a
vacuum left by states. The stated aim of this foundation is to support the goals and
objectives of the United Nations, with special emphasis on the UN’s work on behalf
of economic, social, environmental, and humanitatian causes. Turner is one of
many new philanthropists whose business interests give them both an entrepreneurial
and a global perspective, and who are seeking new partners. Many of the architects
and the beneficiaries of the information revolution, for example, have established new
foundations. This new generation is often more engaged in the activities of its
grantees and frequently sets clear benchmarks for success or failure. Established
funders worry that newcomers to the field may not appreciate the degree to which
social change and policy impact are long-term objectives, requiring some degree of
patience and the occasional leap of faith.
•        •        •
Foundations and their partners have established a solid base upon which to build.
Nonetheless, even the most forward-looking foundations and those they support find
themselves striving to keep pace with an accelerating rate of change. Change is so
rapid and so large in scale that it is more easily captured by the snapshot of
journalistic reporting than by in-depth scholarly analysis. Governmental leaders have
less time to reflect and react during crises, and scholars are hard-pressed to keep up
with new information. On a more positive note, facts about events are now
transmitted within hours, informing journalists, scholars, and activists—and also
eliminating the shadows within which governments and guerillas operated with
relative impunity. Recognizing that the pace of change is only likely to quicken in
the future, foundation officers have placed greater emphasis on promoting
collaboration among non-state actors, governments, and multilateral institutions to
address global challenges, in order to develop the agility to influence events and to
head off emerging dangers.
 Foundations that have recently
conducted their own evaluations include
the Carnegie Corporation through its
Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict; the Rockefeller Brothers Fund
through its Project on World Security;
the Pew Charitable Trusts through its
review of its Public Policy Program; and
the Henry P. Kendall Foundation.
 Such projects include the Global Trends
 Project at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS); the
Pew Charitable Trusts’ funding of the
Council on Foreign Relations study on
America’s national interests; the Ford
Foundation-supported Henry L. Stimson
Center/Overseas Development Council
study and report on “The Leadership
Imperative: Maintaining American
Leadership in the New Era”; the Aspen
Institute’s project on “rethinking
security,” and many others.
 Unlike many foundation initiatives, the
Commission took the risk of making
policy recommendations and was
criticized by those who disagreed with
the findings. Some argued that the
CCPDC was too bold; others asserted
that its recommendations were too timid.
For the Commission publications, see
www.carnegie.org.
 Both the United Nations Foundation
and the Soros Foundations Network fall
into this category.
 According to United Nations
Foundation President Timothy Wirth,
Turner originally planned to pay the
U.S. arrears and then sue the Congress
for the funds, only to learn from his
attorneys that he would not have legal
standing.
 Some have pooled their resources in
community foundations such as
Community Foundation Silicon Valley.
Others, such as the many youthful
retirees from Microsoft, Charles Schwab
& Company, and other successful firms,
have created their own foundations. That
is true of current employees of these and
other firms as well. Schwab encourages
philanthropy and volunteerism on the
part of its employees, offering a two-for-
one match for donations to charitable
organizations and underwriting their
volunteer activities.
 Some professionals versed in the ways of
established foundations have reached out
to this new school. Peter Goldmark,
while president of Rockefeller
Foundation, invited new philanthropists
to travel with him to visit grantees
abroad. Steven Rockefeller, Jr., at
Bankers Trust Private Banking, has
helped guide new funders. And the W.
Alton Jones Foundation has supported
former Ploughshares Fund director
Wayne Jaquith’s efforts to persuade
successful entrepreneurs to become
donors.
 See Jessica T. Matthews, “Power Shift,”
Foreign Affairs (January/February ).
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PART III:  INVESTING IN THE FUTURE
Grant-makers have found that information-driven integration both enables and
requires cooperation and social innovation at all levels of human activity to ensure
that societies can manage and adapt to the transformation underway. The challenge
facing foundations is to devise a grant-making strategy for world security and
stewardship that captures the benefits and meets the challenges posed by this new age.
Such a strategy would aim to strengthen and extend the governing capability of states
and CSOs by embedding them in collaborative arrangements for the peaceful
management of change. It would encourage increased cooperation and innovation.
And it would help others to construct regimes that rely on a combination of
governmental and nongovernmental actors, with the mantle of leadership shifting
from one to the other according to the task at hand.
Grant-making institutions have played a vital role in strengthening the governing
capability of state and non-state actors by supporting academic and policy-relevant
research, practical experimentation, and public education. This section offers a four-
part grant-making strategy, which builds on the accomplishments and experiences of
recent philanthropy and argues that foundation support for greater collaboration and
invention is urgently needed.
Note that while space limitations require that only a few grantees be named in this
document, it is those whose names are not yet known, whose work may be thus far
undiscovered, whom foundation officers are most eager to support. For these
professionals in philanthropy recognize that the leaders of today may not be the
leaders of tomorrow. A key characteristic of this new age is that no small, easily
identified group holds the monopoly on policy or power. New leaders will emerge
from unexpected places and in unanticipated ways. Foundations can provide them
the resources and community they need to assume their new-found responsibilities.
The four complementary strands of grant-making listed here and descibed below
would comprise an integrated agenda:
• Understanding Global Trends: This first strand is devoted to understanding global
trends and their effects. Its purpose is to determine the degree to which the
information revolution, economic globalization, and demographic shifts exacerbate or
ameliorate traditional and emerging dangers. It would employ new or borrowed tools
for measuring the effect of a complex set of interactions. And it would contribute to
the development of a conceptual framework that allows practitioners to consider all
contributors to conflict and state collapse, treating them as symptoms of a syndrome
rather than as separable, isolated, or unimportant events.
• Strengthening Global Actors: This second strand would aim to enhance the
accountability, transparency, and agility of both state and non-state actors so that
they might collaborate effectively in the peaceful management of change. It would
recognize that in the new age these are the attributes of effective governing
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institutions and processes. When change is constant, social innovation needs to
keep pace with technological innovation.
• Effecting New Partnerships: This third strand would identify and seek to address a
transnational danger that cuts across all levels of society and requires a collaborative
response. Grant-making would encourage the design and advocacy of a “hybrid”
regime for managing the danger. And in so doing, it would create a prototype for a
new kind of governance that crosses national and sectoral divides.
• Building a Consensus: This fourth strand would seek to stimulate public
discussion of the interests and values that give purpose to public policy. In a time of
changing relationships, it is difficult to agree on the principles for which each actor
is willing to stand, fight, or pay. The aim, therefore, would be to help all actors
better understand their shifting roles and responsibilities and to contribute to a
lasting consensus upon which new partnerships and polices can rely.
STRAND #1: UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL TRENDS
The deceptive simplicity of the Cold War has given way to a kaleidoscope of
multiple trends and their interactions: technological innovation and economic
globalization, population pressures and environmental strain. The goal of
foundation-supported scholarship has been to develop a more integrated
understanding of these dynamics and their effects, to help identify the kaleidoscopic
patterns, as the pieces fall together, come apart, and combine once again.
In response to the many facets of the kaleidoscope’s images, policy-makers have
begun to consider threats that are spontaneous as well as organized, indigenous as
well as foreign. Some fear that what is at risk is no longer simply territorial integrity,
or even national values—but order itself. They have focused their attention on
challenges posed to governance at all levels. Most recognize that stasis cannot be
maintained, and instead, seek
• useable knowledge that will help them to anticipate change, and
• practical experimentation to develop effective mechanisms for governing.
At the same time they have begun to adopt new concepts—ones that accommodate
the actual dangers and choices they face.
Generating Knowledge
Despite the rich array of research undertaken in the past several years, the precise
ways in which interacting stresses combine to create a crisis is not apparent. Many
policy-makers maintain that the “tipping point” is the moment at which traditional
institutions and processes of governance break down, inequity is perceived, and an
opportunistic leader emerges who is willing to exploit frustrated hopes and
expectations for political gain. This was certainly the case in the Balkans.
But practitioners generally argue that, while further research is needed to better
understand the connections among social change, conflict, and state collapse, it is
unlikely to yield precise predictors of the conditions under which this moment will
occur.
 Many researchers note that indicators
cannot always be distinguished from
causes. And it is not clear whether a
given factor causes or coincides with an
outcome.
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Furthermore, policy-makers do not realistically expect nor may they require such
precise knowledge in order to act and act effectively. Indeed some view the search for
the “tipping point” as a distraction from efforts to build the basis for a workable and
shared policy agenda. Whether stated or unstated, explicit or implicit, policy-
makers’ paradigms have begun to shift as new evidence is offered and opportunities
for action weighed. Practitioners and scholars may not know the precise correlation
between a variety of social ills and conflict. But decision-makers have come to operate
within a framework that allows them to consider all contributors to conflict and state
collapse—and to treat them as symptoms of a syndrome, rather than as isolated,
separable, or unimportant events.
From Practice to Concepts and Vice Versa
To better understand the relationship of current practice to theory, foundations
might choose as a starting point a systematic review of the degree to which new
concepts of “cooperative,” “human,” “environmental,” or “economic” security have
already seeped into decision-making. For example, the Henry L. Stimson Center
proposes and is well positioned to conduct a study of the ways in which the concept
of cooperative security have been tested and applied. Its analysts can build upon the
series of literature reviews already commissioned by the Japan Center for
International Exchanges (JCIE). The resulting report  reveals the differing degrees
to which new conceptions of security and sustainability have become a part of public
and elite consciousness in Asia, Latin America, Europe, Eurasia, Africa, and North
America—documenting important regional and cultural differences.
Foundations might encourage others—who combine scholarship, practical experience
and a willingness to be bold—to go beyond documentation to prescription, offering
recommendations for the future. Consensus for these recommendations will be most
easily achieved if the effort is international from the onset and includes scholars,
private sector actors, and governmental policy-makers, bearing in mind the JCIE’s
findings.
A Focus on Governance
These efforts would contribute to an understanding of the requirements of
governance in a new age, for the impacts of political, economic, environmental, and
technological change on social cohesion or conflict are yet to be fully understood.
Many argue that transnational trends have the potential to integrate communities
around the globe, allowing a new and stable design to emerge. Those who are less
optimistic, however, note that an equally plausible consequence is an increasing
separation into two worlds—one made up of participants in global society, and the
other of those who have opted out or who have been left behind.
Most agree that the processes of globalization and fragmentation are taking place
simultaneously, causing continual shifts in the kaleidoscope’s images. Both George
Washington University scholar James Rosenau and Rutgers University scholar
Benjamin Barber are among those who have written on these twin effects. The debate
continues and has inspired a growth in research into the impact of rapid change on
sovereignty and citizenship the world over.
This focus on globalization and governance has been of particular interest to a cadre
of young scholars in think tanks in major capitals and in Western schools of public
 See Paul B. Stares, “The New Security
Agenda: A Global Survey.”
 Stares, “The New Security Agenda:
A Global Survey.”
 The cooperative security concept appears
to be integrated in Asian security
thinking, for example. And throughout
the world, economic and environmental
considerations have long been linked to
security concerns, but perhaps not as
systematically or as thoughtfully as
scholars might hope. While an academic
might demand a rigorous analysis, the
practitioner wants to know what will
work.
 See James N. Rosenau, Along the
Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring
Governance in a Turbulent World
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, ). Also see Rosenau
and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Governance
without Government: Order and Change
in World Politics (Cambridge and New
York: Cambridge University Press,
). See also Benjamin R. Barber,
Jihad Vs. McWorld: How Globalism and
Tribalism are Reshaping the World
(New York: Ballantine Books, ).
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policy. A critical mass has begun to emerge in North America. Foundation support
for their work might encourage collaboration with colleagues abroad and with private
sector actors, so as to increase understanding of globalization’s effects in different
cultures and in different sectors.
Multidisciplinary Study: Cross-Sectoral Experimentation
Scholars considering the impact of global trends on governance argue that
recognizing emerging patterns requires multidisciplinary study and that acting on
them requires cross-sectoral experimentation. Each involves a long-term perspective
and a lasting commitment on the part of practitioners, scholars, and the foundations
that support them. However, the structure of academic institutions and academic
careers does not currently encourage or reward cross-disciplinary inquiry. And the
easy movement of scholars back and forth between academe and government or
academe and activism is not admired outside of Western capital cities, and not even
allowed in many societies. Incentives therefore need to be created and maintained if
current structures and norms do not support the intellectual requirements of the age.
The focus would be to develop a talent pool on which governments and societies can
draw—one that is comfortable working across sectoral, disciplinary, and national
divides. 
Foundations can build on the success of U.S.-based “centers of excellence” devoted to
multidisciplinary research and analysis by helping to create and support similar
institutions abroad. Scholars in these U.S. institutions often collaborate with
overseas counterparts. Theirs have been important contributions, and society benefits
from their sustained support. Similar institutions are needed in cultures where
independent policy voices are not often heard. Because of the complexity of overseas
grant-making—especially for those foundations without field offices—it may be most
prudent to support efforts by Western centers to transform existing collaborative
projects into lasting institutional arrangements. And the addition of international
participants to ad hoc consortia, which engage scholars from different institutions
and specialties in the joint examination of a specific problem, would also be
beneficial. Equally wise would be the involvement of private sector actors who may
play a policy role.
Some institutions have been dedicated to research and experimentation that span
sectors as well as disciplines. The Sante Fe Institute assembles decision-makers from
all levels of government, business and academe to consider multifaceted problems,
using complex adaptive systems as a methodological tool. New interest in exploiting
the capabilities of multiple sectors has yielded the concept of “hybrid” regimes or
arrangements of state and non-state actors committed to a joint solution of a shared
problem. The regime approach to problem-solving has been discussed in depth by
legal scholars Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes and political scientist Stephen D.
Krasner. The Carnegie Endowment is conducting a systematic review of
opportunities offered.
Research is most useful to the policy community when focused on contemporary
examples. Policy-makers will gain, therefore, from the empirical work of the
Brookings Institution/Johns Hopkins University Center on Social and Economic
Dynamics. With foundation support, the Center will work backward from both
conflicts and non-conflicts to determine why different outcomes occurred in
 Many are in Washington, D.C., at the
Carnegie Endowment, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies,
George Washington University’s Elliot
School, the University of Maryland,
Georgetown, the Paul C. Nitze School
of Advanced International Studies, and
elsewhere. These scholars are joined by
academics at Harvard’s Kennedy School,
Berkeley’s Goldman School, the
University of Toronto’s Peace and
Conflict Studies Programme, and other
institutions throughout North America.
 See Leigh Ann Gilbert, International
Security Futures: Preparing the Next
Generation (a report prepared for the
Henry P. Kendall Foundation, November
), posted at www.rbf.org/pws.
 Examples include Stanford University’s
CISAC, Harvard’s CSIA, or Berkeley’s
Energy and Natural Resources Group,
mentioned earlier.
 At least one U.S.-based think tank, the
Carnegie Endowment, has a Moscow
office. And the International Research
and Exchanges Board (IREX) and the
Princeton-based Project on Ethnic
Relations (PERs) both have well-
developed multidisciplinary networks of
intellectueeal leaders. Finally, Soros’s
International Science Foundations leave
a legacy of independent scholars who
can now create and sustain institutions
of their own but may need the help of
Western funders.
 Other examples include The World
Resources Institute, which collaborates
with the United Nations Development
Programme, and is one of many
organizations that use “scenarios”—a
technique devised by the business
community for corporate planning
purposes—to help imagine different
environmental futures, based on
different assumptions. Furthermore, the
Brookings Institution/Johns Hopkins
University Center on Social and
Economic Dynamics has used the
adaptive agent model employed by
Joshua Epstein and Rob Axtell. See
Growing Artificial Societies, (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, ).
 See Stephen D. Krasner, International
Regimes (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, ). For more on
“hybrid regimes,” see Jessica T.
Mathews, “Power Shift.” See Abram
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes,
The New Sovereignty: Compliance with
International Regulatory Agreements
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
). Also see Abram Chayes,
International Legal Process (New York:
Warner Books, ).
 The Managing Global Issues project,
under the direction of P. J. Simmons,
has convened a group of scholars to
consider ways to apply the lessons of
regimes in one sector to another.
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situations that might, at first glance, appear quite similar. Research such as this is
particularly helpful when it identifies new policy ideas and mechanisms for action
that can gain political support. Current examples include the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program as well as the practice of Joint
Implementation mentioned above. Policy-makers can be overwhelmed as new test
cases are thrust upon them—including civil conflicts in the Balkans, Somalia,
Rwanda, and Kashmir; terrorist bombings in Northern Ireland and East Africa; and
outbreaks of new or reemerging infectious diseases. Under these conditions and under
unforgiving klieg lights, it is difficult to make use of external analysis that does not
yield immediate, practical, and politically palatable solutions.
Interaction Among Policy-Makers and Independent Experts
Foundations therefore have used their convening authority and access to national
policy makers and international organizations to draw together multidisciplinary
groups of scholars, activists, and practitioners to explore practical measures for
governance. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the World Bank, for example, are
joined by other grant-makers and CSO leaders in a discussion of the values that
underpin transnational policy. By providing a neutral forum for quiet deliberation,
foundations can occasionally help bridge the gap that exists between those responsible
for policy management and those most likely to offer methodological innovations.
Some of the most rewarding grants have been to organizations or projects that foster
sustained interaction between independent experts and government policy-makers.
Support for efforts such as the Aspen Strategy Group and the Aspen Institute’s
Congressional Seminars remains a smart investment. More informal dialogues hosted
by the Overseas Development Council, the Council for a Livable World and several
other Washington-based groups are important in the fields of security, environment,
and economic development. Foundations might apply this Washington, D.C., model
to other decision-makers in other places. Given the growing role of non-state groups,
including private sector actors, such an activity would be timely.
A small investment could yield large returns, were a program developed to promote
and nurture sustained dialogue among nongovernmental experts and private sector
actors playing a policy role. Such an effort could be launched in Washington, D.C.,
where a critical mass of scholars, policy-makers, and private sector representatives
reside and work. It could be fostered at Harvard’s Kennedy School in Cambridge,
Massachusetts. And it could be tried on the West Coast, where most business is
global. The Pacific region owes its economic recovery to international industry and
commerce—be it high technology, tourism, entertainment or trade, and the
supporting services. Its workforce—both management and labor—is comprised of
immigrants from other parts of the country and other parts of the world. Twenty
percent of the work-force in Silicon Valley is foreign-born. A large proportion of the
start-ups are Indian owned and out-source to South Asia. Well positioned to take on
the convening role are several agile and inventive organizations with policy knowledge
and strong ties to both established corporations and to start-ups. Foundations might
encourage informal partnerships among them.
Whereas in the early s many foundations saw a need to develop a new paradigm
or conceptual framework, most have concluded that such reconceptualization will
continue to be the result of practical experimentation and policy choice, rather than
 See John D. Steinbruner’s remarks at the
April  meeting of the Rockefeller Brothers
Fund Project on World Security’s Core
Group on www.rbf.org/pws. The Project
commissioned a series of literature reviews on
the state of debate on the relationships of a
variety of social, economic, technological,
cultural, and political factors to political
stability and conflict, which are also available
on the Project’s website and in hard copy. The
debate has been documented; the Center’s
empirical work will take that debate forward,
grounding it in real life examples.
 Many policymakers consulted by the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund Project on World
Security noted that it is not knowledge that
they lack so much as it is politically workable
options for acting. They feel pressured for
quick answers by an impatient public flooded
by information which is neither edited nor
interpreted by mediating institutions.
 Scholars and activists have suggested many
new mechanisms for policy-making and policy
management that have not gained political
support. New methods of calculating the
Gross National Product that integrate the
environmental impact of production and
materials into cost calculations have been
advanced, for example, as have non-regulatory
solutions to environmental problems, circular
production systems, and tools for economic
analysis of long-term change, to make it
possible to take chronic as well as acute
problems into account. Several grantee
organizations have advocated adoption of
these unconventional methods and practices,
but with limited success.
 The Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), Council on Foreign Relations
(CFR), Carnegie Endowment (CEIP),
Brookings Institution, RAND Corporation,
Elliot School, the Paul Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and
Georgetown all have corporate links. Others
might be well positioned to play a convening
role. And CSIS is already leading a discussion
around the country of “global trends” and
their effects. The effort, supported by Intel,
and conducted in cooperation with the World
Affairs Councils of America, is led by Michael
Mazarr, editor of the Washington Quarterly.
 In Los Angeles, there is the combination of
the Pacific Council on International Affairs
(PCIP) and the World Affairs Council of Los
Angeles, both of which are developing ties to
the entertainment industry. In San Francisco
and throughout the Bay Area, there is a World
Affairs Council of Northern California, which
hosts regular round-table discussions of
established and emerging private sector leaders
who discuss their global stake and responsibility.
It has launched a series of discussion groups
with South Asian entrepreneurs in
collaboration with The Indus Entrepreneurs
(TiE). An important recent addition to the
Bay Area is a Rockefeller Brothers Fund-
supported program created by Ruth Shapiro
under the auspices of the Conference Board
and Asia Foundation. It convenes CEOs from
corporations doing business in Asia to discuss
their responsibility to the societies in which
they operate. And in both Seattle and
Portland there are World Affairs Councils,
which are among the fastest growing in the
Council system.
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the other way around. Hence the need for foundation support for a practical
agenda—and the institutional frameworks, habits of cooperation, policy innovations
and political consensus that support its effective pursuit.
STRAND #2: STRENGTHENING GLOBAL ACTORS
Responsibility for practical policies will be shared by five increasingly global actors—
the individual, the nation-state, CSOs, private sector corporations, and multilateral
institutions. The challenge for grant-makers is to strengthen and inform each of these
decision-makers, while encouraging their collaboration, as none can be successful on
its own.
Like the post-Revolutionary War and post-World War II eras, this is a time for
innovation on a large scale. In the s, in a matter of decades, the American
Founding Fathers invented many of the democratic institutions that underpin U.S.
governance today. In the s, the World War II allies introduced the institutions of
international governance upon which states continue to rely and build. The Bretton
Wood accords laid the groundwork for the economic integration that followed,
including the creation of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the
concept of development assistance. The United Nations was born; it gave structure to
a new concept of collective security and was later followed by the creation of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Marshall Plan rebuilt Europe and
Japan and created a new relationship between conqueror and vanquished.
Similarly, the present era calls for a combination of invention and cooperation to
address the challenges ahead. New systems have emerged, and new governing
structures have been formed to manage the process of technology-driven integration.
The World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Council
(APEC), the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), and the European
Union are fora for coordinating the economic activities of many states. A single
European currency, the Euro, once scoffed at, is now a reality, bringing new fiscal
discipline to European countries. NATO is expanding and assuming a new peace-
making and peace-keeping mission. Arms control, environmental, and human rights
objectives are being pursued through well over , multilateral agreements, and
many more bilateral accords have been ratified in the past few decades. At the same
time that new regimes are being created to manage issues across national lines,
statehood itself is an ambition of many localities, and fragmentation is occurring
around the globe. The state-breaking, state-making process is unfolding in the
Balkans, South East Asia, and Central Africa, while conflicts continue to simmer in
such diverse localities as Chechnya, Chiapas, and Kashmir.
In delicate times such as these, integration and innovation must be managed deftly,
with due respect for the danger of upsetting a stable situation or preventing new and
steady patterns from evolving. The findings of the CIA State Failure Task Force and
the  financial crises in Thailand and Indonesia suggest that even otherwise
positive developments, such as democratization or increased economic openness, can
be dangerously destabilizing if the requisite conditions are not in place. Efforts to
improve governance must take local realities into account, so as to avoid destabilizing
setbacks on the road to reform. “One size fits all” approaches to policy are unlikely to
work, even as global norms emerge. Instead, basic principles need to be established
 See remarks by Jessica T. Mathews at
the August  meeting of the Project
on World Security Core Group at
www.rbf.org/pws.
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across borders and cultures: accountability, transparency, equity. They can then be
applied in ways that fit the circumstances and the times.
The role for foundations is to help emerging leaders identify and advance those
principles and to equip these decision-makers for success. Foundations have long
been committed to strengthening the individual, the democratic state, and the civil
society associations that mediate their interactions. Improving governance also has
been a mainstay of the modern philanthropic enterprise. In this new era, the spread
of democracy and technology creates the political opportunity and technical means to
pursue these objectives more globally—and perhaps more boldly than before.
The objectives of grant-making would be to equip state and CSO actors for the
Knowledge Era; to expand their community to include the private sector; and to
support the development of hybrid regimes, or partnerships, among them.
Equipping State and Civil Society Actors for the Knowledge Era
Additional philanthropy might focus on four goals, which will help state and CSO
actors at all levels to respond more nimbly to rapid change:
• The first is to enhance the transparency, accountability, and agility of both state
and non-state actors, recognizing that these are the attributes of success in the
Knowledge Era.
• The second is to improve each actor’s ability to operate in the global domain,
either directly or through the effective use of the media, from the printing press
to the Internet.
• The third is to train the next generation of leaders, reaching young people in
their schools, colleges, and at home through age-appropriate media.
• The fourth is to help create or expand indigenous sources of funding, so that
CSOs can be sustained over time.
Grant-makers are rightly focused on easing the transition in societies that are opening
their economies and their politics. Continued support is needed for programs that
build the democratic institutions and processes that underpin effective governance.
The importance of these undertakings—and of the global transformation
underway—suggests that bolder and longer-term funding patterns be considered. The
National Democratic Institute, for example, now seeks to build a multi-million dollar
endowment to give it the flexibility to seize the opportunities of the day and to take
risks that traditional funding sources might avoid. The Monterey Center for Non-
Proliferation Studies—a foundation favorite—nonetheless feels constrained by
funding cycles. Its leadership is agile; its funding sources are less so.
CSO Actors
Foundations will continue to focus on “agents of change” such as scientists, women,
and various epistemic, or knowledge communities. Many of these social
entrepreneurs are also the engines of economic growth and operate easily in the global
domain. Their advancement may be key to their society’s integration into the global
economy. Foundation support will be needed to support education and training and
to provide access to technology that will help them and their societies leap-frog into
the Information Age and contribute to international community and commerce. See Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift.”
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Often they are represented by emerging CSOs that need technical assistance in order
to attract the funds, membership, and the media attention they need to sustain
themselves and advance their agendas. CSOs have emerged in states as varied as
Indonesia, Russia, and the United States, where they advocate on behalf of goals as
local as tenants’ rights or as global as arms control or environmental protection.
Foundations have provided essential support—often singling out individuals of great
personal courage.
As the role of civic associations and other non-state actors grows, so too does their
responsibility. Oftentimes these nongovernmental groups lack the transparency,
accountability, and efficacy that is required of governmental players. Foundation
support may be needed to help professionalize CSOs—particularly those in societies
that lack a well-developed third sector— as they define public-spirited objectives and
adopt democratic means. Furthermore, their effective use of the media is key to
assuring an international reach. As a general rule, foundations are more apt to fund
programmatic initiatives, rather than provide for institutional capacity-building, but
such support is needed if CSOs are to meet their new-found responsibilities.
Furthermore, indigenous philanthropy needs to be encouraged if these CSOs are to
be sustained.
Expanding the telecommunications capabilities of think tanks and other CSOs
should be a priority for grant-makers, especially those that seek to promote dialogue
across borders. The Carnegie Corporation, for example, offers to publish the work
not only of its own grantees, but of others. Attention to providing for the translation
and overseas dissemination of professional and academic journals is also an important
undertaking. Access to scientific journal, for example, would help build the capacity
of scientific communities in countries where lack of funds, infrastructure, or political
openness has an isolating effect. Similarly the “grey literature” of newsletters and
other informal publications can now be put on-line and made available over the
Internet to interested persons around the world. The simple cost of transcription can
be a wise investment.
Recognizing the role that individuals and CSOs can play, foundations might consider
pooling their resources to jointly bestow awards on individuals or groups on every
continent responsible for making unique contributions to local and global society.
Highly visible awards would not only highlight the importance of knowledge to an
individual’s success in this new era but would underscore the degree to which society
as a whole benefits from the ingenuity of its members. The process of nominating
and awarding the grants would further serve to expose many worthy people to new
sources of funding and would create a forum for foundation officers to share their
knowledge of outstanding “social entrepreneurs.” Finally, it would bring attention to
and confer legitimacy on the work of the awardees, perhaps helping to inspire local
grant-making in their support.
State Actors
The institutions of national governance provide the legal and regulatory framework
within which the public good can be advanced. An important element of
strengthening state capacity is the recruitment and training of the next generation of
scholars and policy-makers. To meet the tasks that they will confront, these new
leaders need to have been exposed to multidisciplinary analysis and to be comfortable
 The success of the campaign to ban land
mines and Mexico’s Zapatista
movement was in large part attributable
to the skillful use of fax and e-mail, as
well as their appeal to the traditional
media.
 Upgrading the information technology
of CSOs is a worthy investment, one
which the Irvine Foundation, the W.
Alton Jones Foundation, and others,
have been willing to make. The
Rockefeller Brothers Fund has also put
some grantees on the Fund’s electronic
network, and has offered the ongoing
support of its own information
technology staff.
 The MacArthur Foundation’s fellowships
offer a model, as do the awards made to
environmental activists on every
continent by the Richard and Rhoda
Goldman Foundation. The Carnegie
Corporation will soon begin to grant
individual fellowships as well. The James
Irvine Foundation has begun to grant
“innovation” fellowships to those making
special contributions to California.
Thomas Homer-Dixon of the University
of Toronto argues that the “ingenuity” of
individuals is the key to a society’s success
in the Information Age.
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in both the world of theory and the world of practice. Many young people are
exposed to the combination of scholarship and policy through fellowship programs at
organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations or the American Association
for the Advancement of Science. Fellowship programs that draw scholars from
abroad, such as the Brookings Institution’s new program for Koreans, are particularly
attractive. Some foundations, like Kellogg and MacArthur, manage their own
fellowship programs. MacArthur augments its program with grants to the SSRC for
individuals engaged in interdisciplinary study. And MacArthur continues to make
small grants in the former Soviet Union.
Improved general and formal education is also needed, to strengthen citizens’ capacity
to make informed decisions in a democracy—and contribute with informed
consent—as well as to expand the talent pool of people willing to pursue policy
careers. Improvements are needed at the elementary and high school levels, as well as
in collegiate and graduate education. People form their views about the world around
them and their role in it at an early age; education about international events and
concerns should therefore begin in elementary and secondary schools, if not before.
However, most foundations that support both secondary school education and
international relations tend to treat them as separate concerns. The trend toward
identifying cross-cutting themes may change this practice. Opportunities might also
be sought to support multimedia efforts to reach younger children in their homes
through television, radio, and webcasting. Foundations might consider partnerships
among broadcast entities, school districts, and CSOs committed to the public
education on international affairs.
Finally, governments benefit from the establishment of think tanks or networks of
scholars able to provide independent advice and analysis. Many societies lack this
asset. However, multinational networks such as those created by the Pugwash
Conferences, the various National Academies of Science, the International Research
and Exchanges Board (IREX) or the Project on Ethnic Relations (PERs) provide a
starting point. At least one U.S.-based think tank, the Carnegie Endowment, has
created a Moscow arm.
Engaging the Private Sector
The goal is to reach out to a new set of decision-makers previously ignored by the
funding community and shunned by some CSOs: corporate leaders and
entrepreneurs in the private sector.
Global competition and the dramatic expansion of international trade underscore the
importance of integrating the private sector into new international arrangements.
International corporations have significant impact, and they make daily choices that
influence national policies and regulatory capabilities, as well as international
negotiations. It is critical to include these global actors, who can advance or
undermine the goals of security, sustainability, and quality of life.
There are clear recent indications that international businesses recognize that their
best interests can be served through the emergence of international norms and modes
of regulation—adding both predictability and stability to the business environment.
They are concerned both with their ability to conduct business transactions globally,
and also with their reputation among consumers as promoters or violators of
 One of the largest philanthropic
organizations in the world, the William
H. Gates Foundation, supports
elementary and secondary education. It
has also supported libraries abroad. It
does not, however, accept unsolicited
grant proposals. Further information can
be found at www.gatesfoundations.org/
whgfoundation/. The James Irvine
Foundation has supported teacher
training and the dissemination of an
elementary and secondary school
curriculum on international affairs,
through the World Affairs Council of
Northern California. The program is
emulated by World Affairs Councils
around the country.
 Public Television KQED and JPKids are
collaborating in the creation of such a
program, Corporation for Public
Broadcasting funding permitting. Both
public and commercial television
stations have launched television shows
for children and young teenagers
focused on scientific and other
educational issues. Foundation support
for PBS multicasting, with the clear goal
of improved international understanding,
is needed.
 The U.S. Chemical Manufacturers
Association, for example, played an
important role in convincing the U.S.
Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Several industry groups
participated in establishing the
Convention’s verification and inspection
provisions.
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humanitarian norms. These are incentives for private sector collaboration in
managing change.
Foundations can explore ways to strengthen the private sector’s role in global
governance by supporting efforts to build consensus on where its policy interests and
roles intersect with the requirements of global stability. Several CSOs are working
with private sector actors to help them define their international policy role and
stake. And there have been effective grass-roots efforts to engage the private sector in
policy concerns. For example, the environmental group Greenpeace International is
credited with having engaged the insurance industry in raising concerns about global
climate change.
Foundations can help the most inventive CSOs that successfully identify the
intersection between the public good and private interests and engage the business
sector in a shared agenda. They can also support business school efforts to instill a
deeper sense of the public interest within the corporate sector and among emerging
business leaders, by including ethics courses and exchange programs. Some
management schools have established programs overseas designed to help build the
institutions of new market economies. Finally, organizations like Business
Executives for National Security and others can be partners in developing consensus
about guidelines for corporate behavior on issues relating to the public good.
In the cases of states, CSOs, and associations of private sector actors, the goal for
foundations can be to strengthen each, so that they can contribute to global regimes.
Strengthening Global Regimes
The goal is to enhance the ability of new decision-makers to work as partners,
constructing “hybrid regimes” of governmental and nongovernmental actors sharing
responsibility and leadership.
Regimes, as the fora in which coordinated policies can be developed to manage
transnational challenges, are increasingly central to global stability. They are unique
in that their international authority rests on shared understandings, often reinforced
by coercive sanctions. The enforcement mechanisms depend on the agreement of
states to establish legislation supporting regime goals. Private individuals, CSOs,
international organizations, and businesses help provide ideas to promote regime
creation and to press governments and international institutions to comply with these
arrangements. This makes such arrangements uniquely inclusive.
“Hybrid” regimes, incorporating non-state and state actors, have spread in recent
years as CSO fora have begun to appear in parallel with formal international
negotiations on such topics as global climate change, ozone depletion, human rights,
and nonproliferation. Increasingly, states have begun to rely on CSOs to effect
international policy change. For example, adherence to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is monitored by citizens’ groups known as Helsinki Watch, which
sprang up around the Helsinki Accords. The transfer and trade of advanced weapons
is followed by a network of citizens’ groups known as Arms Watch, as well as a
number of university-based and other CSOs.
 Among them are the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace,
which hosts a program on the private
sector’s assumption of responsibilities
usually associated with states. Heading
up that program is University of
Maryland scholar Virginia Haufler. The
Council on Foreign Relations has a
significant and loyal business
constituency in New York—including
many of the country’s leaders in finance,
law, the media, and industry—who
participate actively in their programs
and study groups, often assuming the
leadership role. The Conference Board
and the Asia Society have created a
program to engage corporate leaders
doing business in Asia in a conversation
about the responsibility of their
companies to the societies in which they
operate. The World Affairs Council of
Northern California hosts roundtable
discussions among Silicon Valley
executives and recently launched a
program to engage foreign-born U.S.
corporate leaders in a dialogue about
their policy voice both in the U.S. and
in the countries to which they have
family and business ties. It has most
recently co-sponsored a series of
discussions with South Asian-born
entrepreneurs.
 The Haas School of Business at the
University of California/Berkeley, for
example, holds an annual debating
contest on ethics in business, which
includes consideration of the private
sector’s role in promoting the public
good. In , its debate focused on the
international responsibilities of
corporations doing business abroad.
These are the sorts of issues raised and
discussed in ethics courses in business
schools around the U.S.
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In the process of negotiating environmental agreements, states and CSOs have
reinvented the treaty-making process, creating regimes that are more flexible and thus
more responsive to change. One innovation that has resulted is “fluid treaties,” the
terms of which can be changed to take new conditions or new knowledge into
account without renegotiating the accord. The Montreal Protocol on Ozone
Depletion, for example, now requires a deeper cut in chlorofluorocarbon (CFC)
production than originally negotiated because new scientific data supports stricter
terms. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)
built on this fluid model, creating the International Panel on Climate Change, an
international body of over , scientists of world renown, who agreed in  that
human behavior has had a discernable effect on global climate.
Allowing flexibility in a treaty’s terms, either by introducing a rolling compliance
schedule or by systematically drawing upon the knowledge of nongovernmental
experts, are innovations that can be applied in other spheres of international activity.
Recently established regimes have also helped accelerate the timetable for decision-
making in international fora. The Canadian government, for example, accelerated the
pace of international decision-making on the Anti-Personnel Land Mines Treaty by
establishing its own separate forum, along with several humanitarian and arms
control organizations. An agreement was reached among states at the end of ,
bypassing a more cumbersome UN negotiating process. And policy innovations, such
as “joint implementation” and “cooperative threat reduction,” mentioned above, offer
new models for cooperative governance. Both ideas resulted from collaboration
among decision-makers within and outside of governments.
Foundations can help to support the development of new regimes and to bolster
existing accords by enabling nongovernmental players to contribute to hybrid
arrangements. They can help to support citizen movements that are pursuing parallel
efforts. The Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign was a successful example of such a
citizen movement. A current international example is the Earth Charter Initiative,
which is a compact among people to act in a manner that respects and protects the
natural environment. Efforts such as these both promote citizen awareness and build
the normative basis for future intergovernmental or hybrid regimes.
All levels of governance can benefit from capacity-building and reevaluation. The goal
is to ensure a greater range of players both able and willing to cooperate to address
new challenges and to expand the definition of relevant international players. Existing
agreements deserve succor, and new regimes to address chronic or emerging problems
should be created. Educational efforts to preserve and protect traditional regimes like
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, START II, and the Anti- Ballistic Missile
Treaty are an urgent necessity. And hybrid institutions with an expanded circle of
members may prove to be best able to cope with the fluid challenges generated by the
rapid rate of change today.
Today, technological innovation must be matched by political and social innovation
on a large scale. Individuals, states, CSOs, private sector corporations, and
multilateral institutions will need to collaborate in novel ways to meet the
requirements of the times. Recognizing that none of these actors can succeed on its
own, foundations will need to help them all to develop the agility, transparency,
accountability, and constancy that effective governance now requires.
 See Jessica Mathews’s remarks at the
August  meeting of the Project on
World Security Core Group at
www.rbf.org/pws.
 See www.earthcharter.org.
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STRAND #3: EFFECTING NEW PARTNERSHIPS
The transnational dangers confronting the international community can prevent
stable patterns from emerging in the kaleidoscope of globalization. It is important
for foundations to select cases where their involvement can help increase
understanding of interactions among trends, while also demonstrating the relevance
and practicability of cooperative governance. Ideally, one would look for a case that
cuts across all levels of security and engages all relevant actors. The challenge is to
select one, the management of which offers a prototype for a new kind of
transnational and trans-sectoral governance.
By combining the capacities of states and non-state actors in the management of a
shared problem, new “hybrid” regimes can be created that have the flexibility to
take new knowledge and new circumstances into account. International regimes
stem from a combination of relationships, understandings, and shared expectations,
and have shown utility in a variety of fields. It is, moreover, an area in which
foundations and those they support have significant experience.
Several threats exist that can serve as cases for innovative management. Three of
these issues are examined below.
The Nuclear Danger
New conditions call for a reappraisal of the nuclear danger and consideration of new
collaborative strategies for its reduction. Degrading systems of command and
control in Russia raise the risk of the unintended or accidental use of nuclear
weapons on hair-trigger alert. The number of declared nuclear states jumped in 
when India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in quick succession. Despite the
growing consensus that nuclear war cannot be won, nor limited, nor survived, the
U.S., Russia, China, Britain, and France continue to rely on nuclear devices as
weapons of war. New collaborative approaches to security offer an opportunity to
abandon this stance. Advocates of ambitious worldwide regimes that ban the
development, production, deployment, and initial use of nuclear weapons argue
that nuclear war-fighting is a fallacy that can and should be exposed. They
recommend that the declared nuclear powers go beyond de-targeting nuclear
weapons to taking them off alert, separating warheads from delivery vehicles,
renouncing their first use, and reducing their numbers to as close to zero as can be
achieved. There is prestige attached to nuclear weapons, but there is a stigma as
well. They argue that this stigma is the norm upon which new global regimes can be
based.
Regimes that would address nuclear nonproliferation need succor in the wake of
’s nuclear tests in South Asia. In addition to pushing the nuclear powers to
substantially reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons, those states which have
dismantled active nuclear programs—South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina—could
draw upon their moral leadership to help the international community join in
rejecting nuclear weapons. Reinforcing new regimes can be non-state actors, such as
Arms Watch and the Monterey Institute’s Center on Non-Proliferation Studies,
which maintains an electronic database on the development, testing, and sale of
nuclear and missile technology.
 The Rockefeller Brothers Fund’s
security program, for example, was
devoted to supporting organizations
working for the extension of the
nonproliferation treaty (NPT) in the
early s. Other foundations
supporting the NPT extension included
Ford, Carnegie, MacArthur, the
Prospect Hill Foundation, the Winston
Fund, the Ploughshares Fund, the John
Merck Fund, and others. A multi-
foundation approach to issues that rely
on normative change has also been
effective in the climate change and
nuclear freeze debates.
 See Morton H. Halperin, Nuclear
Fallacy:Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear
Strategy (Cambridge: Ballinger, ).
 ADVANCING  STABILITY  IN  AN  ERA  OF  CHANGE
Regional security arrangements may also be required to address the demand side of
the nuclear proliferation problem by reducing uncertainty. The supply side of the
problem involves the systematic tracking of nuclear and ballistic missile transactions
and the laws governing this commerce. The efforts of journalists, independent
scholars, and activists can supplement those of governments, increasing transparency
and raising awareness of violations of agreed-upon norms. Furthermore, independent
programs to train a new generation of nonproliferation specialists, in both the
established nuclear states, and especially in the newly declared nuclear states, deserve
the continued support of foundations, as they are important investments in
security.
Light Weapons Trade
Another case that has stimulated the interest of many groups from a range of
backgrounds is the control of the light weapons trade. Small arms deserve attention
because they present a threat that cuts across all levels of society—individual, local,
national, and international—as well as affecting all regions around the globe. They
play a key role in both interstate and civil conflicts as well as violent crime.
Establishing a regime to address this problem would be difficult, because states hold
no monopoly on the light weapons trade, and the opacity of the current global arms
market facilitates re-transfer and theft. Yet control of light weapons requires a regime
approach for these very reasons. Regimes can provide a forum in which to develop a
consensus that the light weapons trade represents a profound and shared problem.
Transparency, another principle of regimes, is also essential to confront the murkiness
of the arms trade. This opacity is aggravated by the rapid spread of technology, but it
can also be addressed by new information technology that can ease the tracking of
weapons through tagging.
This is not to suggest that solutions are easily achieved. Light weapons present a
problem of immense dimensions, and obstacles to the control or limitation of the
arms trade range from normative disagreements about the merits of gun control to
the simple fact that a wide variety of weapons are available on every continent.
Monitoring and controlling the movement of these weapons would be extremely
difficult. Such a regime would also have to overcome resistance at many levels: from
weapons manufacturers and the governments that represent them, CSOs and
individuals that perceive weapons ownership as a right or necessity, and governments
that perpetuate their rule by intimidation, fear, or violence. Yet small arms present an
acute and immediate threat to individuals around the globe and play a key role in
violent crime, civil conflict, and interstate war. The enormity of the problem suggests
that mitigating this danger should be a priority. But it is a task that must be
undertaken with a long-term perspective, as no easy solutions are likely.
Both international organizations and individuals are seeking new approaches to the
problem of light weapons diffusion. A combination of human rights activists,
humanitarian relief organizations, and security specialists has taken on this issue
around the world and has considered a variety of local, regional, and international
policy initiatives. Scholars Michael Klare and Jeffrey Boutwell have documented their
efforts, and, on more than one occasion, convened a representative group, which
could form the core of a strong coalition. Each actor has contributed to the cause;
their combined work deserves support.
 The Monterey Institute’s Center for
Non-Proliferation Studies trains those
responsible for enforcing export
controls in Soviet successor states.
 See Jeffery Boutwell and Michael Klare,
Light Weapons and Civil Violence: Policy
Options for the International Community
(New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund,
), and on www.rbf.org/pws.
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The United Nations monitors embargoes to determine their effectiveness and has
worked to publicize the scale of the weapons trade problem, in order to generate
more effort. Some individual governments and regional organizations are working to
establish agreements on weapons limitations in their regions. Finally, recent efforts by
the Canadian, Belgian, and Norwegian governments to convene discussions of the
small arms trade make this an auspicious moment to promote international controls
in this area.
Biological Weapons and Infectious Disease
The related dangers of biological weapons and infectious disease create a third area in
which regimes have clear utility. Multinational networks to track the outbreak and
spread of disease exist but need to be strengthened. And new technologies offer the
hope of determining the likelihood of disease outbreaks in particular regions, making
it easier to target specific regions for intensive prevention efforts by members of the
medical community, relief agencies, the International Red Cross, and state and local
governments. A surveillance and response network designed to monitor and react to
the emergence of infectious diseases might also be applicable to the problem of
biological weapons proliferation. This model of collaboration across sectoral and
governmental lines has the potential to address the threat of the spread and use of
biological weapons, a particularly accessible means of violence for terrorists.
Foundations can promote the examination of this option and can educate the public
on its need, desirability, and feasibility.
The regime around the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is in need of
strengthening. The BWC currently has no enforcement mechanism, and compliance
is voluntary. Like the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the BWC requires better
means to track equipment. Safeguards on the transfer of agents internationally can be
improved, especially by engaging the scientific community. Developing a protocol for
inspections to strengthen the convention could also be augmented by supporting
mock inspection efforts, to show the feasibility and efficacy of such visits. Efforts to
develop a framework for the exchange of technological information for peaceful
purposes might also be promoted. The International Center for Genetic Engineering
and Biotechnology, comprised of most developing countries, is examining the
question of peaceful scientific exchanges of sensitive biological information and
agents. Foundations could also fund mock inspections and scientific engagement on
biological transfers.
Pursuit of effective modes of transnational governance can help meet some of the
world’s most pressing challenges. But developing shared understandings and
expectations requires agreement on the principles for which each actor is willing to
stand, fight, or pay. Without such agreement, it is not possible to devise or sustain
strong alliances and effective policy. In an era of ever-changing relationships, it is
difficult to reach such a consensus. Education at all levels of human activity is a
prerequisite to effective governance on the local, national, and transnational levels.
STRAND #: BUILDING A CONSENSUS
The information revolution and resulting globalization offer the prospect of greatly
broadening education’s bounds. The combination encourages increased contact and
offers better tools for communication. However, other aspects of the new era—the
 Christopher F. Chyba, Biological
Terrorism, Emerging Diseases, and
National Security (New York: Rockefeller
Brothers Fund, ), and on
www.rbf.org/pws.
 ADVANCING  STABILITY  IN  AN  ERA  OF  CHANGE
speed of change and the new level of transparency needed to sustain international
transactions—can serve to undermine deliberative process. Further complicating
consensus-building efforts, a false sense of polarization can take hold. The new media
used to express or transmit views tend to erase the grey areas, and politics and policy
can be driven by the conflicting extremes that result. Added to this, in an era of
globalization, multiple allegiances and identities exist, which are both fluid and
changing.
Among the most problematic barriers to consensus building is the fear that attention
to any one issue will result in the neglect of another. Trade-offs are magnified
between the near- and long-term, between the domestic and foreign. The challenge,
then, is to demonstrate relationships among issues, focusing on the local
consequences of international events and the long-term effects of short-term action.
The commitment of foundations to public education and engagement allows them to
tackle this problem head-on; their interest in social equity impels them to consider
the human condition as a whole; and their attention to responsibility is a reminder
that, in an interdependent world, all states have both a stake and an obligation.
The key then is to engage a range of actors in a process of self-examination and to
commit them to a process of collaboration. This strand of grant-making might
comprise six strategies that seek to encourage collaboration, engage key
constituencies, and build consensus around transnational issues.
1. Support for Epistemic Communities
The first strategy is to support the international activities of the many knowledge
communities that have a network, an audience, and the capacity to communicate
across political lines. National organizations such as the various academies of sciences
around the world, and U.S. associations such as the American Association for the
Advancement of Science or the American Physical Society have a history of
interacting with counterparts abroad. Their members participate in international
teams that review specific scientific problems without regard to political or policy
views. And they regularly travel to international conferences and exploit new
communications tools as part of their “peer review” process. This habit of
professional interaction has led to the development of sub-groups and committees
concerned with specific issues, such as human rights, environmental change, or arms
control. Their intellectual contributions have provided ideas and legitimacy for novel
state policies and have contributed to the building of an international consensus.
Finally their interactions have created a culture in which the advancement of
knowledge—a public good—is deemed as important as, if not more important than,
the advancement of an individual or a single state’s agenda. Foundations have
supported both scientific associations and individual scientists and engineers, in
recognition that they often are at the forefront of reform. Furthermore, scientists and
other independent analysts can provide policy-makers with alternative sources of
information, upon which their decisions can be based. If freed from government
patrons by independent funding sources, scientists and other analysts can offer an
alternative to state-controlled information in societies around the world and provide a
needed policy voice.
Scientists and engineers represent one of many epistemic communities with
international reach and influence. The labor movement has played an historic role in
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advancing individual and group rights around the world. It has reinforced the human
rights movement, which helped build consensus for and continues to monitor
compliance with the Helsinki Accords. Bar associations of lawyers have contributed
to building democratic institutions and processes in countries in transition. And
military officers have helped their overseas counterparts define their evolving role in
new democracies. These contributions to building a more stable order deserve
continued support.
Foundations have two opportunities. The first is to help membership organizations
both expand their international reach and deepen their roots in their communities.
While many U.S.-based groups have partners overseas, their ability to take advantage
of those relationships is hampered by limited travel funds, inadequate
communications technology, or even the lack of an introduction which a foundation
leader might provide. Assistance with organizational development, as groups
internationalize, can be a worthy investment. A second opportunity for grant-makers
is to encourage those with existing international ties to use their relationships to foster
discussion and consensus-building on specific issues of shared concern. An example is
the nascent conversation among members of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences
and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on the question of human rights.
2. Support for Advocacy Organizations and Educational Campaigns
Traditional scientific societies often overlap and spawn sub-groups with a specific
policy interest, such as the Nobel Prize-winning International Pugwash Conferences
on Science and World Affairs, mentioned above. Many epistemic, or knowledge,
communities spawned advocacy groups with a special expertise to offer or authority
with which to speak. They too have benefited from support for extending their
international reach. In many cases, the international network now exists but is in
need of strengthening. Some affiliates are not as accountable or transparent as others.
Other advocacy groups—whether formed around shared knowledge, interests, or
values—comprise an international network, as is the case with another Nobel
Laureate, Amnesty International. With Amnesty as a model, foundations have an
opportunity to help others operate on a professional level and in the international
realm. As new issues emerge, so too will new combinations of actors willing to
coalesce around a clear goal. Foundation officers are in a position to expose new
activists to the best practices of their forebears.
Collaboration across state lines is important, but so too are partnerships at home.
Foundations have an opportunity to encourage and support national coalition efforts
for public education on specific policy initiatives. Effective coalitions have been built
around such issues as the nuclear danger or the spread of light weapons, as discussed
above, as well as global climate change. Foundation support for educational efforts in
these areas would build on the rich history of support for regimes to advance
nonproliferation, arms control, conflict prevention, human rights, and environmental
protection. The NGO-led campaign to ban land mines provided an example of the
power of public education and advocacy, using the tools of the Information Age. It
too was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
At key moments in the past, foundations have joined forces to finance important
international public policy campaigns, funding separate communities like physicians,
educators, and business leaders as well as supporting their sustained, systematic
 Examples include Physicians for Social
Responsibility, the Federation of
American Scientists, the Union of
Concerned Scientists, Physicians for
Human Rights, Lawyers Alliance for
World Security, and the Nobel Prize-
winning International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War.
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interaction. Organizations like Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
and its national affiliates, Physicians for Social Responsibility, the Union of
Concerned Scientists, the Federation of American Scientists, Business Executives for
National Security, the Lawyers Alliance for World Security, and Educators for Social
Responsibility benefited from this approach and were able to help shape public
attitudes toward nuclear weapons issues. Today, more fluid concepts and broadened
agendas make it harder to focus attention on a single issue. And the reality of
fundraising is that competition among organizations can yield more dollars than
would cooperation. Foundations can encourage collaboration or the forging of
effective campaigns by following two complementary strategies. The first is to
support new mechanisms for collaboration—the costs of a shared staff person,
mailings, meetings, e-mail, and other communications. The second is to offer support
to the participants in the coalition using an equitable formula. The Nuclear Policy
Committee described above is a good example of a small investment that yields high
returns. It would fail, however, were funders unwilling to also support the individual
organizations that comprise the committee.
3. Support Neutral Forums for Discussion
The third strategy is to support those organizations within the U.S. that provide a
truly neutral forum and have the capacity to reach a cross-sectoral audience.
Deliberation on issues of transnational concern is needed in all countries, as their
roles change and grow. The U.S. faces a particular challenge, due to its assumption of
leadership—but with the prior rationale for this leadership removed. The U.S.,
therefore, confronts the need to return to its first principles, an examination of the
intersection between its interests and its values, in order to evaluate how and why it
should be engaged around the globe. It is not the only state that is rethinking its role
in world affairs, and some organizations, such as the Pacific Council on International
Policy, the Asia Foundation, TransAfrica, the Atlantic Council, and the Japan Society
are able to draw together intellectual and political leaders from abroad to consider
their evolving relationships.
Organizations that provide a truly neutral forum should be encouraged and aided in
launching deliberative processes across disciplines, sectors, and political points of
view. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) which features an elite, engaged, and
informed membership, is known for its studies program and its meetings at which
government, corporate, and CSO leaders from around the world address the
organization’s membership. In recent years, the CFR has broadened its reach through
aggressive and effective use of the media, including webcasting and videoconferencing,
and collaborative programs with regionally-based organizations. Furthermore, it has
sought a younger, more diverse membership.
Also well respected for the quality of its programming, the Aspen Institute holds a
number of highly professional conferences on international issues for leaders from
academe, business, and CSOs in the United States and abroad, frequently
commissioning papers and publishing the proceedings. The American Assembly also
convenes government and citizen leaders in different combinations around particular
issues or policy concerns and produces a published volume, which is sent to a wider
audience.
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The World Affairs Council system offers a model for broad citizen engagement. Its
affiliates are organizations with open memberships and deep ties to their
communities. The system includes the Foreign Policy Association, which develops
“Great Decisions” study group topics and materials; the Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations, which publishes analyses of public opinion polls on attitudes toward
international engagement; and the World Affairs Council of Northern California,
which provides teacher training and curricula at the elementary and secondary school
levels. The council “system” of  organizations offers a unique opportunity to
support a dialogue on the U.S. role in the world among both business and citizen
leaders throughout the country. These conversations take place in meeting rooms,
class rooms, and over websites, and many councils host their own weekly television
and radio shows.
The United Nations Association is a network that is under new leadership and has a
new source of funding with the creation of the United Nations Foundation. Other
membership organizations, discussion groups, and website “chat rooms” are being
created in cities and towns throughout the country, as Americans struggle with
questions about their country’s, their employer’s, and their own role in the world.
Resisting a winner-take-all approach to grant-making in this realm is important, as
citizens seek out their own, most comfortable fora. At the same time, foundation
funds are limited, and decisions will need to be made based on an organization’s
potential to reach emerging decision-makers from a variety of walks of life, to provide
focus to the debate, and to contribute to a consensus that is broad-based and
enduring.
4. Support Education of Policy-Makers
A fourth means of engaging diverse actors is to support thoughtful interaction
between government policy-makers and independent experts. To be effective, these
efforts should be continued for a sustained period and should include international
travel. Travel abroad, coupled with respectful, informal meetings with experts, can
help legislators come to terms with America’s stake, interest, and potential role.
Ensuring the neutrality and objectivity of such fora will improve their ability to create
an atmosphere for deliberation and learning rather than for partisan politics.
In the s and s, foundations supported dialogue among legislators through
vehicles such as Parliamentarians for Global Action and the Aspen Institute
Congressional Program. The Aspen Congressional Seminars offer invaluable vehicles
for sustained dialogue among legislators and provide for exposure to new scholarship.
This depends, however, on the skills of former Senator Dick Clark, who is a highly
effective moderator. Foundations have worked with the former Senator to identify a
successor once he chooses to retire. The Aspen Institute also houses the Aspen
Strategy Group, another model of discussion and decision-making among policy-
makers. Its membership is comprised of current, former, and likely future
government officials who interact with senior scholars in week-long sessions.
5. Strengthening Service Organizations and Supporting Track II Diplomacy
CARE, Doctors Without Borders, Mercycorps, the Catholic Relief Services, the
International Red Cross, Jewish Community Services, and other community or faith-
based service and relief organizations receive their core support from individuals,
governments, churches, or synagogues, especially in times of crisis. They engage in
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direct action, negotiating cease-fire agreements or providing shelter, food, health care,
and relocation services for refugees. They are sources of information and influence
and should be supported in their efforts to educate policy-makers and engage like-
minded organizations. These are not the only organizations that work directly with
states or foreign nationals, sometimes undertaking tasks normally associated with
governments. Some, like the Carter Center, Search for Common Ground, the
Conflict Management Group, or the Project on Ethnic Relations, engage in conflict
resolution exercises or negotiations, sometimes hammering out accords that are later
agreed to by governments. Some, like the Nautilus Institute, have been able to travel
to otherwise closed societies, like North Korea, to assist in the development of
alternative energy projects. The Rocky Mountain Institute has advised China on its
Energy Future. Foundations can use their convening function to help these
organizations share their experiences with one another, with scholars, and with
government officials, so that those with shared goals benefit from their knowledge.
Furthermore foundations have been effective in financing efforts to sustain dialogue
across borders, on questions of rural development, resource preservation, or any of
the other myriad problems that transcend borders and cultures. The Center for East-
West Studies has been clever in identifying such opportunities to build confidence
and habits of cooperation in East Central Europe. Several organizations have been
working on water issues in the Middle East, some dating back two decades or more.
6. Foundation Initiatives
Foundations need not be shy about using their convening authority to leverage their
grant-making. Foundations can create for a for discussion, new frameworks for
action, and new sources of attention and funding. Carnegie Corporation’s decision to
publicize the scholarship not only of its own grantees but of other experts, is a
generous and important contribution that can bring both publicity and legitimacy to
new work. The multi-foundation Global Interdependence Initiative, first advanced
by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the World Bank, is a new venture. The project
is based on the belief that eliciting and strengthening the public’s emerging “global
values” may be a critical task if the U.S. stance toward the rest of the world is to
become more genuinely cooperative and more consistently engaged. The initiative
proposes to facilitate a broad-based dialogue in the United States on the challenges
and opportunities presented by rapid globalization.
This initiative, which was launched at the end of , will be sustained for ten years,
provided that intermediate assessments warrant continuation. To be effective, the
initiative will need to be collaborative, involving foundations, CSOs, corporations,
and multilateral and bilateral agencies. The initiative’s constituency-building activities
will need to take advantage of existing organizations and enlarge upon their outreach
efforts. It will benefit from the existence of cooperative efforts such as the Coalition
for American Leadership Abroad (COLEAD), which seeks to build public support for
the foreign policy budget and programs of the U.S. government. It can take
advantage of those organizations that provide a neutral forum, a safe haven for debate
that respects the sometimes private process of decision-making. Finally, it can help to
reinforce efforts by political leaders such as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to
build public support for global engagement.
•        •        •
ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND •  PROJECT ON WORLD SECURI T Y
As states and civil societies struggle to assure their survival, coherence, and
advancement, the U. S. government and its citizens have an interest in providing
help. But, the shifting rules of world order call for what Jessica T. Mathews terms
“leadership without primacy”—something that is difficult but necessary for American
political and citizen leaders to accept, absorb, and put into operation. If Americans
fail to nurture their democracy by failing to fully participate in or contribute to its
future, then it will become increasingly vulnerable to the dangers of a rapidly
changing world.
Education and activism can motivate citizens to support notions of global
engagement and to demand that their political representatives support policies that
support this aim. Philanthropy can play an important role both as a model and in
encouraging citizen participation. Ideally, this would start with education and
outreach programs designed to expand awareness of international interdependence
and common goals.
 ADVANCING  STABILITY  IN  AN  ERA  OF  CHANGE
PART IV: CONCLUSION
Humankind knows it cannot afford the political, social, and environmental chaos
that rapid change can trigger. As a consequence, people yearn for a stasis that can no
longer be maintained. Grant-making should support the search for the means by
which to anticipate and allow the fragmentation of familiar images, while working to
avoid chaos and thereby welcoming the patterns that do emerge. It should seek to
provide the knowledge and methods that will enable individuals, states, and societies
to know when and how to move beyond the shattered image; to turn the
kaleidoscope once more; to achieve a new and dynamic order that is equitable,
sustainable, and secure.
This approach to grant-making offers a positive vision of an ever-expanding world
community with a stake in and responsibility for managing peaceful change. Because
the rapid interaction among people and problems is global in scale, there is a need to
expand that community to every corner of the globe, paying particular attention to
those actors whose engagement is essential to the success of global regimes.
This grant-making strategy acknowledges the reality of interdependence and
embraces the view that global stability is best pursued by enmeshing a growing
number of social actors into a larger political, economic, and security order. In this
conception states and non-state actors build a web of relationships, giving them more
in common than in conflict, reducing the benefits and raising the costs of violent
conflict. This view holds that the net effect of such integration is the reduction of war
between states and an increase in domestic prosperity and stability, increasing
opportunities for all. It maintains that the combination of cooperative regulation and
innovation will allow societies worldwide to break the cycle of pursuing their own
security and prosperity at the expense of others, and of pursuing today’s at the
expense of the future.
